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	 Abstract			 	 	Between	a	Bear	and	an	Eagle:	Soviet	Arms	and	the	U.S.	Response	in	Peru					This	research	looks	at	the	left-leaning	military	government	of	Juan	Velasco	Alvarado	of	Peru	ruled	from	1968	to	1975.	This	government	embarked	on	a	crusade	to	modernize	Peru	through	a	series	of	reforms	and	changes	in	Peruvian	foreign	policy.	The	United	States	responded	with	non-overt	economic	pressure,	and	the	ending	of	military	sales	to	Peru.	Peru	bought	weaponry	from	the	Soviet	Union	against	the	wishes	of	the	United	States	in	1973,	and	this	resulted	in	a	more	conciliatory	foreign	policy	from	the	United	States	towards	the	Andean	nation.	The	shifting	foreign	policy	is	the	opposite	of	how	historians	have	characterized	relations	between	the	United	States	and	Latin	America.			My	research	contributes	to	the	historiography	of	United	States-Peruvian	Relations	by	expanding	on	very	limited	coverage	of	the	Velasco	period.	This	is	examined	through	a	regional,	high	level	diplomatic,	and	economic	lens.	This	thesis	argues	that	the	United	States	is	willing	to	work	with	left	leaning	Latin	American	governments	if	expropriated	companies	are	properly	compensated.			This	period	in	American-Peruvian	history	is	incredibly	important	to	explaining	the	motivations	and	goals	in	U.S.	foreign	policy.	The	examination	of	Soviet	Arms	in	Peru,	and	Peru’s	work	in	the	early	Drug	War	is	a	new	addition	to	the	historiography	of	this	subject.									
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1	
	 	 Chapter	1	 	 			 The	United	States	and	Peru	have	enjoyed	an	unusually	beneficial	relationship	compared	to	nearly	all	other	Latin	American	countries.1	This	connection	is	largely	based	on	the	close	ties	between	Peru	and	the	United	States	military.	The	United	States	wanted	a	strong	ally	in	South	America	to	maintain	influence	in	the	continent,	and	Peru	wanted	an	alliance	with	the	United	States	to	increase	trade	and	counter	the	power	of	Chile.	The	military	bond	began	during	the	War	of	the	Pacific	in	the	late	1870s	and	became	truly	foundational	to	Peru	after	the	First	World	War.	This	alliance	inadvertently	helped	to	create	the	military	dictatorship	of	Juan	Velasco	Alvarado	in	1968	also	known	as	the	Institutional	Peruvian	Revolution.	This	revolution	was	one	of	the	stranger	episodes	in	Latin	American	history	as	this	was	a	military	regime	based	upon	left	leaning	principles.	Even	more	remarkably	U.S.	leaders	responded	rather	benevolently	to	Peru’s	decision	to	buy	Soviet	weapons	in	1973.	However	strains	persisted.	Peru	expropriated	U.S.	companies;	it	made	a	sharp	turn	towards	encouraging	investment	from	other	countries	besides	the	United	States	and	attempted	comprehensive	land	reform.	Previous	narratives	of	the	Peruvian	Revolution	provide	little	detail	on	the	Soviet	arms	that	entered	into	Peru	and	their	significance.	The	Soviet	arms	played	an	important	part	of	the	foreign	policy	experience	during	this	time	period	and	showed	the	flexibility	of	the	United	States’	diplomacy	towards	Peru.		U.S.	foreign	policy	in	Latin	America	focused	upon	compensation	for	expropriation,	pragmatic	realism,																																																									1	The	majority	of	historians	will	agree	that	the	history	of	U.S.-Latin	American	nations	in	the	20th	century	is	generally	the	story	of	imperialism,	interventions,	economic	domination,	and	Cold	War	antagonisms	mixed	with	periods	of	pan-Americanism	and	reconciliation.	Peru’s	experience	in	the	20th	century	included	many	of	the	conflicts,	but	the	United	States	treated	the	Andean	nation	with	general	benevolence.	
2		 	and	anti-communism.	Peru	exploited	these	goals	by	playing	the	United	States	off	the	Soviet	Union	to	maintain	and	increase	its	power	in	Latin	America,	and	the	global	community	during	the	Cold	War.		The	United	States	accommodated	Peru	during	the	revolution	for	a	few	simple		reasons.	The	United	States	badly	needed	an	ally	in	the	region	to	confront	growing	Marxism	in	the	Andes.	In	1970,	Chile	became	the	first	Latin	American	country	to	have	a	Marxist	led	government	.	Left	leaning	presidents	came	to	power	in	Bolivia	and	Ecuador	at	roughly	the	same	period,	and	the	United	States	needed	to	retain	an	overall	positive	relationship	with	Peru	to	keep	the	situation	from	spiraling	out	of	U.S.	control	Secondly,	Peru	and	the	United	States	held	an	important	relationship	prior	to	the	1968	revolution.	Lastly,	Peru	sufficiently	compensated	the	businesses	that	it	expropriated.	This	provided	an	important	example	to	other	Latin	American	Governments	how	capitalism	should	be	respected.	There	is	relatively	little	written	about	in	U.S.-Peruvian	relations	in	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	particularly	in	comparison	to	the	numerous	volumes	dedicated	to	the	United	States’	experience	in	Chile	during	the	same	years.	Richard	Walter’s	Peru	and	the	
United	States,	1960	-1975:	How	Their	Ambassadors	Managed	Foreign	Relations	in	a	
Turbulent	Era	is	by	far	the	most	important	book	on	the	subject.	Walter	argued	that	Nixon’s	trust	in	military	governments	and	the	work	of	Peruvian	ambassadors	enabled	Peru	to	follow	a	more	independent	course	in	foreign	policy.2	Abraham	Lowenthal’s	The	Peruvian	
Experiment	and	with	Cynthia	McClintock	The	Peruvian	Experiment	Reconsidered	are	both	exceptionally	helpful	for	understanding	the	goals,	successes,	and	failures	of	the	revolution																																																										2	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-1975:	How	their	Ambassador	Managed	
Foreign	Relations	in	a	Turbulent	Era	(University	Park:	Pennsylvania	State	University,	2010),	12.		
3		 	in	economic	and	ideological	terms.3	In	these	key	works,	Lowenthal	carefully	analyzed	the	key	ideologies	of	Peruvian	nationalism	and	communism	and	how	they	changed	from	the	pre=Velasco	to	the	Velasco	to	the	post-Velasco	eras.		Frederick	Pike’s	The	United	States	and	the	Andean	Republic’s	characterizes	the	late	1960s	and	1970s	as	an	era	where	many	South	American	governments	attempted	to	escape	their	dependency	on	the	United	States.	Peru	is	shown	to	be	a	nation	where	nationalism	and	non-US	foreign	capital	was	promoted	at	the	same	time.4	An	excellent	example	is	the	payment	of	compensation	to	expropriated	companies	and	the	dramatic	rise	of	foreign	investment	during	Velasco’s	tenure.	The	United	States	and	the	Andean	Republic’s	true	importance	is	its	focus	on	the	regional	situation	in	Latin	America	and	its	effect	upon	U.S.	diplomacy.	The	author	argues	that	the	increased	hostility	to	U.S.	interests	in	the	Andes	from	Chile’s	Salvador	Allende,	Peru’s	Velasco,	and	the	numerous	left	leaning	military	governments	in	Ecuador	limited	what	the	United	States	was	able	to	do	against	Peru.	These	governments	distrusted	the	framework	of	the	Alliance	for	Progress	that	encouraged	workers	to	be	independent	from	the	government.	Latin	American	leaders	preferred	to	have	the	people	dependent	on	the	government	to	maintain	control.	This	created	a	fascinating	dynamic	where	governments	in	Latin	America	depended	greatly	on	the	United	States	for	economic	stability	but	could	also	use	this	dependence	to	propagate	the	entrenched	anti-Americanism	in	their	nations.	Peru	derived	great	strength	from	this	dependency	while	exploiting	the	fact	that	the	United	States	also	depended	on	Peru’s	role	stabilizing	a	pro-U.S.	
																																																								3	Abraham	Lowenthal	and	Cynthia	McClintock,	The	Peruvian	Experiment	Reconsidered	(Guildford:	Princeton	University	Press,	1983),	22.	4	Frederick	Pike,	The	United	States	and	the	Andean	Republics:	Peru,	Bolivia,	Ecuador	(Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press),	347.	
4		 	stance	in	the	region.	Pike’s	seminal	work	redirected	the	historiography	toward	a	focus	on	the	regional	perspective	rather	than	the	simply	an	examination	of	a	Latin	American	nation.		Lowenthal	was	more	interested	in	measuring	the	success	of	the	Peruvian	Revolution	than	examining	the	regional	situation	in	the	Andes.	Lowenthal	stated	that	the	revolutionary	government	failed	in	both	economic	and	reformist	goals.	He	only	briefly	addressed	US-Peruvian	relations,	focusing	primarily	on	the	anti-US	corporate	sentiment	held	by	many	Peruvians	who	were	exploited	by	the	military	government.	Cynthia	McClintock	co-authored	the	former	book	and	also	co-authored	Peru	and	the	United	States:	Cooperation	at	a	Cost,	which	argues	that	even	though	the	cooperation	has	existed	since	the	1820s,	it	has	only	diverged	a	small	number	of	times	since	then.5	She	argued	that	this	relationship	became	more	strained	during	the	Velasco	period,	but	Velasco	and	his	government	understood	that	in	order	to	stay	in	power	they	would	have	to	play	a	game	of	improving	and	diminishing	U.S.	relations	to	use	as	a	bargaining	chip	against	the	“Colossus	of	the	North.	“		Moving	to	an	examination	of	key	players,	Richard	Walter	examines	the	relationship	through	a	high	level	diplomatic	focus	that	attributes	the	leniency	of	U.S.	policy	to	the	need	of	the	United	States	for	an	ally	in	the	region.	The	Nixon	administration	believed	that	military	regimes	in	Latin	America	could	be	trusted		to	be	pro-U.S.,	stabilizing	forces	in	the	region	far	more	because	they	held	power	more	firmly	than	civilian	governments.	Walter’s	work	helped	to	direct	focus	on	diplomacy	as	a	way	to	examine	the	Peruvian-U.S.	relationship.	
Allende’s	Chile	and	the	Inter-American	Cold	War	by	Tanya	Harmer	continued	Pike’s	work	by	putting	the	presidency	of	Salvador	Allende	in	the	1970s	into	the	regional	context																																																									5	Cynthia	McClintock	and	Fabian	Vallas,	The	United	States	and	Peru:	Cooperation	at	a	Cost	(New	York:	Routledge	Press,	2003),	8.	
5		 	of	Latin	America’s	Cold	War.6	Harmer	argues	that	the	United	States	played	less	of	a	role	in	the	downfall	of	the	Allende	government	than	previously	thought.	She	also	states	that	the	military	government	of	Brazil	as	well	as	Chilean	conservatives	influenced	the	situation	far	more	than	other	historians	have	attributed.	Harmer	concludes	that	the	main	reason	that	Chile’s	relations	with	the	United	States	were	tense,	and	Peru’s	were	not,	was	because	Peru	compensated	investors	after	expropriation.		 Hal	Brands’	article,	“The	United	States	and	the	Peruvian	Challenge,	1968-1975”	is	a	post-revisionist7	examination	into	the	diplomatic	difficulties	of	the	leftist	regime.	Brands	concludes	that	several	different	factors	enabled	Peru	to	gain	the	upper	hand	in	foreign	policy	and	forced	the	United	States	to	treat	Velasco	as	an	ally	in	the	region.	These	factors	included	the	need	for	a	friend	in	South	America,	Peru’s	repayment	of	expropriated	properties,	fear	of	driving	Peruvians	to	the	Soviets,	and	the	willingness	of	Peruvians	to	work	with	the	United	States.8			 Lawrence	Clayton’s	Peru	and	the	United	States:	The	Condor	and	the	Eagle	states	that	there	have	been	four	different	frameworks	used	to	explain	the	relations	between	the	United	States	and	Peru.9	The	first	is	the	traditional	asymmetrical	framework	where	the	United	States	and	business	interests	dominated	the	relationship	and	successfully	maintained	this	position	throughout	the	20th	century.	The	second	framework	is	the	dependency	theory	stating	that	Peru	has	been	subject	to	world	forces	that	put	it	within	the																																																									6	Tanya	Harmer,	Allende’s	Chile	and	the	Inter-American	Cold	War	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2011),	17.		7	Post-Revisionism	in	US-Latin	American	Diplomacy	argues	that	the	United	States’	hegemony	is	greatly	due	to	compliant	elites	in	Latin	America	and	their	governments.		8	Hal	Brands,	“The	United	States	and	the	Peruvian	Challenge,	1968-1975”	Diplomacy	&	
Statecraft	21	(2010):	472.		9	Lawrence	Clayton,	Peru	and	the	United	States:	The	Condor	and	the	Eagle	(Athens:		University	of	Georgia	Press,	1999),	10.	
6		 	overwhelming	power	of	the	United	States.	However	the	author	goes	further	with	this	to	create	a	post-dependency	model	in	which	he	states	that	Peru	has	domestic	factors	such	as	American	owned	businesses	causing	it	to	be	greatly	influenced`	by	the	United	States.	The	third	framework	is	the	ambivalent	feelings	that	Peru	has	towards	the	United	States.	Peruvians	embraced	American	culture,	products	and	capital,	but	voices	of	dissent	would	pop	up	to	change	their	own	foreign	policy.	The	final	framework	suggests	that	the	two	countries	generally	share	the	same	conceptions	of	liberty	and	equality	but	occasionally	diverged,	resulting	in	a	tumultuous	relationship	for	a	period.		Clayton	concludes	that	the	Velasco	regime	remained	hostile	to	the	United	States	for	its	entirety,	and	its	most	lasting	impact	was	the	destabilization	of	the	region	by	the	heightened	fear	of	war	in	the	1970s.10	The	expropriation	of	the	International	Petroleum	Company,	Cerro	de	Pasco,	Anderson	Clayton,	and	Casa	Grace	by	the	Velasco	regime	played	an	important	role	in	Clayton’s	narrative	by	showing	the	extreme	nationalism	of	Velasco	and	the	Peruvian	people.	However,	this	book	does	not	address	the	levels	of	accommodation	shown	to	Peru	by	the	United	States.	The	historiography	of	the	Velasco	regime	will	continue	to	grow	as	U.S.	diplomatic	and	military	documents	continue	to	be	declassified.	This	thesis	builds	upon	the	work	of	Tanya	Harmer	and	Frederick	Pike	to	see	the	1970s	as	a	critically	important	period	regionally	in	Latin	America	for	U.S.	policy.	The	Soviet	arms	are	not	just	a	footnote	in	the	history	of	the	Velasco	regime.	Their	introduction	to	Peru	had	a	direct	influence	on	the	changing	policy	of	the	United	States	on	the	Latin	American	nation.	The	non-overt	economic	pressure	that	had	been	sustained	since	1969	by	the	Nixon	administration	shifted	to	a	more	conciliatory	foreign	policy	in	September	1973	after	Peru																																																									10	Lawrence	Clayton,	Peru	and	the	United	States:	The	Condor	and	the	Eagle	(Athens:	University	of	Georgia	Press),	256.		
7		 	announced	that	it	had	purchased	weapons	from	the	Soviet	Union.	The	issue	of	Soviet	Arms	has	been	largely	ignored	in	past	narratives.	This	is	due	to	classification	issues	with	documents	and	past	historians’	focus	on	Chile’s	Marxist	leader,	Allende,	in	terms	of	Soviet	relations	with	Latin	America.	The	entrance	of	Soviet	arms	into	Peru	posits	an	important	question	to	historians.	Why	did	the	United	States	allow	the	recalcitrant	nation	to	obtain	such	weapons	without	enacting	harsh	penalties?	The	most	direct	answers	are	pure	economics	and	ideology.	Compensation	for	expropriated	businesses	and	the	disavowal	of	Marxism	gave	the	Velasco	government	the	ability	to	survive	its	move	away	from	U.S.	influence	while	Allende’s	Chile	could	not.	U.S.	officials	apparently	agreed	with	U.S.	businessmen	that	the	economic	sanctions	were	actually	counterproductive	and	changed	the	punitive	policies.	The	regional	situation	of	Latin	American	politics	in	the	early	1970s	forced	the	United	States	to	accept	left	leaning	allies	in	its	fight	against	communism.	Leftists	came	to	power	in	Ecuador,	Bolivia,	and	Peru	during	this	period,	and	President	Nixon	did	not	react	the	same	way	to	these	nations	as	he	did	to	Chile.	Peru’s	unusual	left	leaning	military	dictatorship	allowed	the	nation	to	move	away	from	the	United	States	while	simultaneously	negotiating	with	its	traditional	ally	to	keep	essential	support	flowing.		The	Peruvian	experiment	ended	in	August	of	1975,	but	the	legacy	of	Juan	Velasco	Alvarado	continued	with	the	recent	Leftist	president	Ollanta	Humala	from	2011	to	2016.		Finally,	there	has	been	relatively	little	written	focusing	on	Peruvian	agency	in	this	relationship.	Walters’	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-1975	is	by	the	far	the	most	comprehensive	and	important	work	in	the	historiography	that	focuses	on	the	direct	actions	of	the	military	government	in	how	U.S.	foreign	policy	developed	during	those	years.	Frederick	Pike’s	The	United	States	and	the	Andean	Republics	is	seminal	in	introducing	the	
8		 	regional	aspect,	but	it	does	not	highlight	the	role	of	Latin	Americans	enough.		This	work	is	adding	to	a	trend	in	the	historiography	that	highlights	Latin	American	agency	in	the	shaping	of	U.S.	foreign	policy.	Hal	Brands’	Latin	America’s	Cold	War	and	James	Siekmeier’s	Bolivian	Revolution	and	the	United	States	place	a	far	greater	importance	on	the	actions	of	elite	and	non-elite	Latin	Americans	in	the	shaping	of	Cold	War	politics	in	the	Western	Hemisphere	than	previous	authors.	Alan	McPherson’s	The	Invaded	examines	Latin	American	responses	to	U.S.	military	invasions	in	the	early	1900s	to	explain	the	eventual	end	of	this	form	of	imperialism.	These	works	have	contributed	to	the	trend	of	adding	the	importance	of	work	done	by	Latin	Americans	to	the	historiography	of	U.S.	foreign	relations.		The	diplomatic	finesse	by	the	Peruvian	government	during	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	directly	contributed	to	U.S.	accommodation	to	the	regime.	Any	examination	into	U.S.	foreign	policy	is	insufficient	without	studying	the	actions	and	intentions	of	the	foreign	power.			 	Thesis	Organization		 The	first	chapter	focuses	on	the	military	and	political	connections	between	Peru	and	the	United	States	prior	to	the	Peruvian	Revolution	in	1968.	This	includes	the	political	clashes	that	helped	create	the	revolution	such	as	U.S.	support	for	a	political	group	hated	by	the	Peruvian	military,	refusals	by	the	United	States	to	supply	napalm	to	the	Peruvian	army,	and	the	conflict	over	an	infamous	oil	company.	The	second	chapter	details	what	the	Peruvian	Revolution	attempted	to	accomplish	and	how	these	activities	promoted	independence	from	the	United	States.	The	chapter	also	focuses	on	the	direct	line	of	events	
9		 	from	Chile’s	devastating	1970	earthquake	to	its	election	of	Allende	as	president	-	all	occurring	the	same	year	Peru	began	purchasing	Soviet	arms.	The	final	chapter	expounds	upon	the	work	of	the	previous	chapter,	but	spotlights	the	direct	cause	and	effect	of	the	Soviet	arms	deal	on	U.S.	foreign	policy.					 		 			 	 	 							 																	
10		 			 Chapter	2																		 Peru	meets	its	Northern	Neighbor		 	The	history	before	the	1968	Revolution	is	made	up	of	three	historical	periods	that	exhibit	the	shifts	in	the	U.S.-Peruvian	relationship.	From	1879-1941,	the	United	States	played	a	rather	limited	role	in	Peruvian	affairs	but	the	relationship	found	its	beginning	during	the	War	of	the	Pacific	and	the	naval	mission	during	the	Augusto	Leguía	presidencies.	The	second	period	spanning	from	1941-1957	saw	the	United	States	gaining	vast	power	in	Latin	America	with	the	nation	becoming	the	primary	supplier	of	military	equipment	and	the	most	important	trading	partner	for	the	region.	These	military	sales	were	meant	to	create	a	stable	government	in	Peru	while	creating	a	dependence	on	the	United	States	for	the	supplies.	The	final	period	from	1958-1968	saw	the	most	dramatic	shift	in	U.S.-Latin	American	relations.	The	era	began	with	Nixon’s	rocky	trip	in	1958	followed	by	the	Cuban	Revolution	the	next	year.	The	United	States	and	Peru	found	their	relationship	increasingly	troubled	until	the	breaking	point	in	1968.	The	United	States	wanted	to	maintain	economic	and	military	dependence	in	Peru	while	the	Peruvian	government	needed	this	support	to	remain	in	power.	The	increase	in	economic	nationalism	in	Peru	drove	a	wedge	between	the	two	countries.	Few	nations	can	trace	such	a	long	and	beneficial	relationship,	but	stark	differences	would	become	apparent	after	the	Peruvian	revolution	of	1968.		 The	first	military	connection	between	the	United	States	and	Peru	began	during	a	Chilean,	Peruvian,	and	Bolivian	conflict	known	as	The	War	of	the	Pacific,	1879-1881.	In	1879	the	War	of	Pacific	erupted	over	control	of	the	lucrative	guano	and	nitrate	industry	in	a	disputed	region	between	Chile	and	Peru	and	subsequently	Bolivia	was	brought	into	the	
11		 	war	on	the	side	of	Peru	through	an	earlier	defensive	pact.11		Businessmen	from	the	United	States	sold	arms	to	both	sides	during	the	war	and	a	few	veterans	of	the	American	Civil	War	served	in	the	rival	armies.	The	United	States	attempted	to	mediate	between	the	powers	six	different	times	but	failed	disastrously	due	to	poor	diplomacy,	a	change	in	the	presidency,	and	congressional	disapproval.12	The	United	States	hoped	that	mediation	would	be	an	important	foothold	for	American	power	in	the	region	while	Peru	hoped	the	United	States	would	provide	a	lenient	decision	after	the	war.	However,	the	U.S.	government	ended	up	serving	as	a	mediator.	The	Treaty	of	Ancón	in	1883	ended	hostilities,	but	Peru’s	loss	of	the	Tacna,	Arica,	and	Tarapaca	regions	in	the	south	lead	to	future	problems	as	Peru	would	demanded	the	return	of	these	areas.		In	1896	the	first	foreign	military	officers	arrived	in	Peru,	but	rather	than	coming	from	the	Americas	they	arrived	from	France.13		The	Escuela	Superior	de	Guerra,	Escuela	de	
Caballería,	Escuela	de	Infantería,	Escuela	de	Artillería	all	fell	under	the	modeling	and	authority	of	French	officers	well	into	the	1920s.	France’s	influence	profoundly	shaped	the	army	until	1940	when	World	War	II	brought	the	United	States	to	support	the	Peruvian	army.	The	French	also	sponsored	a	naval	mission	from	1905-1912,	as	well	as	a	disappointing	aviation	mission,	mission	of	a	creation	of	a	Peruvian	Air	Force,	at	the	end	of	1910s.	However,	the	greatest	impact	of	France’s	support	in	the	armed	forces	came	from	the	military	schools	that	the	French	had	championed.	World	War	One	ended	the	dominance	of	
																																																								11	Peter	Flindell	Klarén,	Peru:	Society	and	Nationhood	in	the	Andes,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2000),	185.	12	Lawrence	Clayton,	Peru	and	the	United	States:	The	Condor	and	the	Eagle,	61.		13	Dirk	Kruijit,	Revolution	by	Decree:	Peru	1968-1975	(West	Lafayette:	Purdue	University	Press,	2003),	31.	
12		 	France	in	the	affairs	of	Peru,	and	gave	the	United	States	the	world	standing	that	South	America	found	useful.			Peru	hoped	to	gain	U.S.	support	for	reclamation	of	the	territories	of	Arica	and	Tacna	lost	to	Chile	during	the	War	of	the	Pacific.	Peru	sought	to	use	the	naval	mission	to	weaken	any	Chilean	resistance	to	this	plan.	This	support	materialized	under	the	presidency	of	Calvin	Coolidge	when	General	John	J.	Pershing	arrived	in	Arica	in	1925	to	decide	how	to	settle	the	dispute.14	Pershing	worked	for	over	a	year	until	health	reasons	forced	him	home,	but	his	replacement’s	efforts	culminated	in	the	Treaty	of	Lima	in	1929.	Chile	received	Arica,	Peru	regained	Tacna,	and	Chile	paid	Peru	six	million	as	an	indemnity.	Peru	and	Chile	celebrated	moderately,	they	were	decidedly	happy	that	this	almost	fifty	year	argument	had	come	to	a	close.	This	came	at	the	same	time	as	U.S.	mediation	over	Peru’s	border	with	Colombia.	However,	Peru	unhappily	felt	that	it	had	to	accept	the	Colombian	border	settlement	to	please	the	United	States	in	order	to	reach	the	Treaty	of	Lima.15	This	was	the	start	of	contention	between	the	US	and	Peru.		The	institutional	beginning	of	the	US-Peruvian	military	connection	began	under	the	presidency	of	Augusto	Leguía,	who	served	from	1908	to	1912	and	then	again	from	1919-1930.	Leguía	asked	his	counterpart	in	the	United	States,	Woodrow	Wilson,	to	establish	a	naval	mission	to	train	and	modernize	the	Peruvian	navy.	16	This	arrangement	pleased	both	sides	as	the	increasingly	bloody	and	financial	cost	of	controlling	the	hemisphere	was	
																																																								14	Lawrence	Clayton,	Peru	and	the	United	States:	The	Condor	and	the	Eagle,	139.		15	Frederick	Pike,	The	United	States	and	the	Andean	Republics,	203.		16	Joel	Christenson,	“From	Gunboats	to	Good	Neighbors:	U.S.	Naval	Diplomacy	in	Peru,	1919-1942	”	Ph.D	Dissertation,	West	Virginia	University,	2013,	38.		
13		 	becoming	a	problem	for	the	United	States	and	Peru	hoped	that	closer	ties	to	the	Colossus	of	the	North	would	bring	foreign	investment.17		Along	with	these	military	missions,	Peru	welcomed	an	economic	mission	from	the	United	States.	Edwin	Kemmerer,	a	Princeton	economist	known	as	the	“Money	Doctor”,	visited	the	Andean	nations	in	the	1920s	to	promote	a	series	of	financial	reforms	to	improve		government	functions	and	the	economies	of	the	Andean	nations.	These	reforms	consisted	of	cutting	government	programs	and	employees,	paying	the	national	debt,	and	lowering	taxes	on	businesses.	The	Great	Depression	would	end	the	Andean	governments’	trust	in	the	reforms.		The	U.S.	military	mission	in	1920	proved	to	be	a	success	for	the	navy	of	Peru,	and	the	mission	only	solidified	the	eleven-year	reign,	Oncenio,	of	Augusto	Leguía.	The	U.S.	navy	based	its	modernization	on	three	distinct	goals;	building	the	power	of	the	Peruvian	navy	through	submarines,	creating	a	naval	academy	based	upon	the	US	Naval	Academy	in	Annapolis,	Maryland,	and	creating	an	aviation	corps	run	by	the	Peruvian	Navy.18	The	United	States	made	this	modernization	possible	by	granting	loans	to	the	Peruvians	in	order	to	purchase	American-made	armaments	and	by	Peruvian	acceptance	of	an	American	economist,	William	W.	Cumberland,	as	administrator	of	Peruvian	customs.19	Four	type	R	submarines,	a	naval	academy,	and	an	aviation	program	based	around	three	Boeing-made	training	planes	made	Peru	a	far	more	formidable	force	in	Latin	America.	However,	Leguía’s	fall	from	power	in	1930	forced	the	United	States	to	give	up	most	of	its	military	influence,																																																									17	The	U.S.	stationed	troops	in	Nicaragua	from	1912	to	1925	and	again	from	1926-1933.	Thomas	W.	Walker	and	Christine	J.	Wade,	Nicaragua:	Living	in	the	Shadow	of	the	Eagle	(Boulder:	Westview	Press,	2011),	18.		18	Joel	Christenson,	“From	Gunboats	to	Good	Neighbors:	U.S.	Naval	Diplomacy	in	Peru,	1919-1942,”	68.		19	Christenson,	“From	Gunboats	to	Good	Neighbors,”	94.		
14		 	and	the	Great	Depression	created	a	great	deal	of	anti-U.S.	sentiment	that	France	and	fascist	Italy	happily	exploited.	During	the	Great	Depression,	Peru	turned	to	fascist	Italy	from	1937-1941	to	help	their	Air	Force	by	welcoming	Italian	aviation	missions,	but	there	is	little	evidence	of	long-term	influence	from	Italy.20	France	continued	its	programs	in	the	army	until	1940.	American	influence	in	the	armed	services	gained	a	lasting	foothold	with	effects	that	would	continue	throughout	the	century.			The	end	of	World	War	II	brought	far	closer	ties	to	the	United	States	as	Peru	became	a	major	recipient	of	U.S.	military	aid	second	only	to	Chile.21	No	other	nation	had	the	capability	to	supply	Latin	America	with	arms	and	equipment	during	and	after	the	Second	World	War,	and	the	United	States	happily	used	the	opportunity	to	consolidate	power	in	the	region.	This	military	and	economic	relationship	greatly	helped	the	economies	and	political	elite	in	Latin	America.	Peru	supported	the	UN	war	effort	in	Korea	and	profited	from	the	increased	price	of	copper	and	tin	caused	by	the	conflict.	Under	the	Mutual	Assistance	agreement	of	1952,	Peru	and	agreed	to	limit	trade	with	communist	nations,	and	agreed	that	the	United	States	would	be	the	primary	supplier	of	military	hardware	for	the	Latin	American	nation.22				 	 	 Cold	War	and	US-Peruvian	Relations	Between	1950	and	1965	the	Peruvian	government	received	over	59.3	million	dollars	in	military	grants	from	the	United	States	government.	This	statistic	is	even	more																																																									20	Ronn	Pineo,	Ecuador	and	the	United	States:	Useful	Strangers	(Athens:	University	of	Georgia	Press,	2007),	110.	21	Daniel	Sharp,	U.S.	Foreign	Policy	and	Peru	(Austin:	University	of	Texas	Press,	1972),	38	22	James	Carey,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1900-1962	(Notre	Dame:	University	of	Notre	Dame	Press,	1964),	143.	
15		 	impressive	when	combined	with	the	fact	that	over	seventy	five	percent	of	Peruvian	officers	who	trained	overseas	studied	in	either	the	Panama	Canal	Zone	or	the	United	States	mainland.23		This	coincided	with	the	establishment	of	the	Center	for	High	Military	Studies,	
Centro	de	Altos	Estudios	Nacionales	or	CAEM,	by	the	dictatorship	of	Manuel	Odría	in	1950.	The	CAEM	based	itself	on	the	War	College	in	Pennsylvania	and	the	earlier	French	academies.		The	army	became	particularly	close	to	French	doctrine	as	all	the	officers	connected	to	the	1968	coup	attended	the	CAEM,	absorbing	the	theory	that	officers	should	be	technocrats	as	well	as	leaders.	The	leaders	of	the	Peruvian	Revolution	of	1968	drew	many	of	their	ideals	from	their	experiences	at	the	CAEM.	The	army	schools	commissioned	and	promoted	officers	based	largely	on	academic	performance	and	encouraged	students	to	believe	that	the	Peruvian	army	should	play	a	pivotal	role	in	improving	the	lives	of	Peruvians.	Director	of	the	CAEM,	José	del	Carmen	Marín	Arista,	developed	a	curriculum	that	taught	that	national	security	involved	addressing	the	poverty	of	its	citizens.24	The	military	believed	that	they	would	have	to	modernize	Peru	in	order	to	prevent	communist	uprisings.	Fostering	paternalism	rather	than	self-sufficiency	dominated	the	political	thinking	of	the	academy.	Julio	Cotler’s	chapter	in	The	Cambridge	History	of	Latin	America	remarks	that	U.S.	officials	understood	that	power	in	Peru	resided	among	the	large	landowners,	bankers,	and	the	North	American	companies.25	It	would	become	hard	for	the	U.S.	to	argue	that	change	in	Peru	was	not	necessary.	The	Center	for	Higher	Military	Studies’	philosophy	is	easily	seen	through	Cotler’s	chapter.	Here	students	learned	that	the	military	
																																																								23	Daniel	Sharp,	U.S.	Foreign	Policy	and	Peru,	45.	24	Dirk	Kruijt,	Revolution	by	Decree:	Peru	1960-1975,	36.	25	Julio	Cotler,	The	Cambridge	History	of	Latin	America	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2008),	281.		
16		 	would	have	to	play	an	extremely	important	role	in	the	modernization	and	forging	of	a	more	economically	and	socially	equitable	Peru.			 Another	important	factor	in	US-Peruvian	relations	was	the	Alianza	Popular	
Revolucionaria	Americana	or	APRA.	The	United	States	covertly	funded	the	Alianza	Popular	
Revolucionaria	Americana	or	APRA’s	founder’s	,	Victor	Raúl	Haya	de	la	Torre,	bids	for	political	office.26	The	APRA	party	was	founded	1924	on	a	platform	of	anti-imperialism,	pan-Americanism,	and	economic	nationalism	with	the	hope	that	every	Latin	American	nation	would	start	its	own	APRA	party.	The	petty	Bourgeoisie	and	urban	workers	who	constituted	the	majority	of	APRA	members	wanted	to	regain	power	from	the	ultra	wealthy,	and	reverse	the	unequal	modernization	of	the	twentieth	century.27	Haya’s	platform	predicated	itself	on	the	belief	that	rulers	should	be	enlightened,	but	with	a	dominating	power	to	both	defeat	its	enemies	and	inspire	unconditional	public	support.	Despite	the	similarity	with	later	ideology	espoused	by	the	military,	the	Peruvian	army	never	identified	with	APRA.	When	Haya	lost	the	Peruvian	election	for	president	in	1931,	Aprístas	turned	to	violence.	A	prison	in	Trujillo	captured	by	the	revolutionaries	became	the	sight	of	gruesome	executions	of	dozens	of	members	of	the	army	and	civil	guard.28	The	army	responded	with	a	massacre	of	thousands	of	APRA	supporters	in	the	shadow	of	the	ancient	city	of	Chan-Chan.	Tensions	continued	to	grow	worse	as	the	APRA	attempted	to	foment	revolution	in	the	Navy	by	convincing	sailors	to	mutiny	in	1948.29	The	military	responded	by	bringing	to	power	Manuél	Odría,	and	overthrowing	the	president	José	Bustamente	who	had	held	office	since																																																									26	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-1975:	How	their	Ambassador	Managed	
Foreign	Relations	in	a	Turbulent	Era	(University	Park:	Pennsylvania	State	University,	2010),	17.		27	Frederick	Pike,	The	United	States	and	the	Andean	Republics,	231.		28	Peter	Flindell	Klarén,	Peru:	Society	and	Nationhood	in	the	Andes,	275.	29	Klarén,	Peru:	Society	and	Nationhood	in	the	Andes,	298.		
17		 	1945.	Despite	the	similar	politics	leanings,	APRA	and	the	Peruvian	military	never	trusted	each	other	again,	and	the	armed	forces	would	do	whatever	it	could	to	prevent	the	party	from	gaining	power.	As	a	response	to	military	repression,	APRA	moved	towards	the	center	of	the	political	spectrum	as	the	twentieth	century	progressed.	This	shift	occurred	as	the	APRA	party	hoped	to	become	a	more	legitimate	party	that	would	not	be	suppressed	by	the	Peruvian	government.		The	Odría	dictatorship	is	an	important	stepping-stone	from	the	political	world	of	pre-WWII	and	the	turn	towards	reform	to	prevent	the	spread	of	communism.	Peru	immediately	began	to	cultivate	as	much	foreign	investment	as	possible	and	obtained	over	eight	hundred	million	dollars	of	investment	by	1956.30	Three	hundred	million	came	from	the	United	States	alone.31	Although	Odría	cultivated	the	support	from	the	extreme	right,	many	workers	gave	their	support	as	he	attempted	to	model	his	rule	on	the	populism	of	Juan	Perón	in	Argentina.	He	did	this	by	providing	land,	services,	and	public	works	for	the	urban	poor	who	lived	in	shantytowns	circling	Lima.	The	end	of	the	war	also	brought	an	economic	mission	similar	to	the	Kemmerer	one	from	the	1920s.	The	Klein	mission	of	1949	similarly	called	for	a	balanced	budget,	broader	tax	structure,	and	an	end	of	the	subsidization	of	certain	goods,	but	differed	by	arguing	that	Peru	needed	to	keep	its	foreign	affairs	in	the	western	hemisphere	since	Odría	had	been	moving	towards	closer	relations	with	Japan	in	the	late	1940s.	Despite	the	acceptance	of	these	economic	recommendations,	Peru	would	not	completely	acquiesce	to	complete	support	for	U.S.	foreign	policy	of	economic	liberalization	and	economic	orientation	towards	the	United	States.	Odría																																																									30	John	V.	Kofas,	Foreign	Debt	and	Underdevelopment:	U.S.-Peruvian	Economic	Relations.	(Lanham:	University	Press	of	America,	1996),119.		31	Peter	Flindell	Klarén,	Peru:	Society	and	Nationhood	in	the	Andes,	300.		
18		 	installed	communists	as	labor	leaders,	but		encouraged	capital	from	the	United	States	as	well	as	from	European	nations.32		The	most	important	military	connection	between	Peru	and	the	United	States	during	Odría’s	eight-year	tenure	occurred	in	1952	with	the	Mutual	Assistance	Pact.	This	pact	committed	the	United	States	and	Peru	to	share	equipment,	services,	information,	and	military	assistance	with	each	other	to	defend	the	Western	Hemisphere.33	Military	aid	rose	astronomically	from	100,000	dollars	in	1956	to	59.3	million	by	1965.	A	U.S.	army	mission	arrived	in	1956	as	part	of	this	funding.	The	United	States	gave	these	funds	partially	to	implement	infrastructure	improvements	to	promote	modernization.	However,	this	modernization	often	came	at	the	expense	of	workers	and	the	poor.	In	1953,	the	Peruvian	dictator	brutally	suppressed	the	strikes	of	trade	unionists,	textile	and	sugar	workers.	Labor	of	all	kinds	was	treated	more	favorably	after	the	strikes,	but	only	when	the	workers	were	willing	to	work	within	the	Peruvian	government’s	purview.	The	Mutual	Assistance	Pact	strengthened	governments	in	Latin	America,	but	many	Latin	Americans	saw	the	pact	as	a	continued	example	of	the	U.S.	meddling	in	their	nations.		In	1956	under	pressure	from	elite	Peruvians,	Odría	decided	to	allow	free	elections,	which	presented	a	new	path	for	Peruvians.	Fernando	Belaúnde	Terry,	representing	the	center	left	Popular	Action	Party,	Manuel	Prado	representing	the	newly	created	Pradist	Democratic	Party,	and	the	former	dictator	ran	as	head	of	the	National	Odriista	Union.	Prado	won	the	election	by	gaining	the	support	of	the	left	for	his	promise	to	legalize	the	APRA	party	once	in	office.34	Prado’s	most	important	contribution,	or	subtraction	appropriately,	to																																																									32	Frederick	Pike,	The	United	States	and	the	Andean	Republics,	296.		33	Daniel	Sharp,	U.S.	Foreign	Policy	and	Peru,	38.		34	Peter	Flindell	Klarén.	Peru:	Society	and	Nationhood	in	the	Andes,	307.		
19		 	the	US-Peruvian	relationship	consisted	of	a	concerted	effort	to	move	his	nation	away	from	economic	dependence	on	North	America.	Peru’s	1957	recession	showed	government	officials	that	diversification	could	help	Peru	weather	the	economic	storm.	However,	Prado	remained	a	product	of	the	upper	classes	so	his	policies	continued	to	help	the	bourgeoisie	with	some	small	concessions	to	the	working	class	due	to	his	alliance	with	APRA.		The	intelligentsia	reacted	with	anger	over	these	changes,	and	the	famous	1958	Nixon	tour	of	Latin	America	provided	an	important	outlet	for	Latin	American	frustration	with	the	United	States.	Widespread	frustration	stemmed	from	U.S.	support	of	dictatorial	regimes	and	economic	inequality.	Nixon’s	visit	to	Peru	in	May	1958	resulted	in	a	promise	of	loans	for	development	that	Peruvians	desired,	but	the	visit	went	downhill.	Demonstrators	burned	the	American	flag	wreath	left	by	the	statue	of	revolutionary	war	hero	José	de	San	Martín,	college	students	from	the	Catholic	University	of	Lima	refused	to	meet	Nixon,	and	representatives	from	the	Chamber	of	Congress	criticized	U.S.	economic	policies.35	The	South	American	tour	turned	violent	during	Nixon’s	last	stop,	Venezuela,	after	a	group	of	angry	Venezuelan	students	in	Caracas	almost	overturned	the	vice-president’s	car.	This	event	began	to	show	the	United	States	that	its	pre-World	War	II	foreign	policy	aims	of	merely	making	a	stable	business	situation	for	Latin	America	would	need	to	change,	but	it	would	take	two	significant	events	for	a	true	reevaluation.			 	 	 Cuba,	the	United	States,	and	Peru	The	first	dramatic	shift	in	Cold	War	politics	for	Latin	American	came	with	the	success	of	Castro	in	the	Cuban	Revolution,	and	the	second	came	with	the	election	of	John	F.	Kennedy	as	President	of	the	United	States.	The	Cuban	Revolution	showed	that	a																																																									35	Jon	V.	Kofas,	Foreign	Debt	and	Underdevelopment:	U.S.-Peruvian	Economic	Relations,	165.		
20		 	determined	number	of	rural	insurgents	could	overthrow	a	Latin	American	government	and	cultivate	popular	support.	Peru’s	situation	mirrored	the	Cuban	environment	in	several	important	ways.	The	peasantry	remained	in	a	feudal	economic	system	in	which	only	thirty	percent	of	the	Indians	of	the	Sierra,	Peru’s	inner	highland,	spoke	Spanish.36	Population	growth	forced	many	of	these	people	into	the	cities,	and	in	just	one	example,	the	urban	poor	drove	the	population	of	the	city	of	Huancayo	from	27,000	in	1940	to	67,000	in	1961.	The	population	growth	and	the	decline	for	Peruvian	goods	due	to	the	end	of	World	War	Two	and	the	Korean	War	as	well	as	regional	famines	created	a	new	drive	for	peasants	to	leave	the	countryside.		The	modern	peasant	movement	began	in	the	state	of	Pasco	when	the	Cerro	de	Pasco	Copper	Corporation	ended	a	program	to	give	farmers	part	time	employment	in	the	mines	in	1958.	These	peasants,	also	known	as	comuneros,	took	over	hacienda	land	in	response	to	their	inability	to	survive.	These	peasant	movements	reached	their	apex	with	the	military	suppression	and	the	deaths	of	ten	comuneros	in	1962.	The	government’s	actions	drove	the	movement	deeper	into	the	jungle	for	future	radicalization,	and	began	the	military’s	left-leaning	political	consciousness.37		Soldiers	saw	the	intense	poverty	of	the	countryside,	and	the	incredible	despair	sustained	by	an	unequal	system.	The	implications	of	the	poverty	frightened	both	the	military	and	the	United	States,	who	feared	that	the	mal-distribution	of	wealth	would	increase	the	attraction	of	communism.			 US-Peruvian	Relations	Come	into	Conflict:	insurgencies	and	coups																																																									36	Peter	Flindell	Klarén,	Peru:	Society	and	Nationhood	in	the	Andes,	312.		37	John	V.	Kofas,	Foreign	Debt	and	Underdevelopment:	U.S.-Peruvian	Economic	Relations,	192.	
21		 	President	Kennedy	and	the	State	Department	initiated	the	Alliance	for	Progress	in	an	effort	to	reduce	Latin	Americans’	attraction	to	communism	from	becoming	the	dominant	political	ideology.	The	Alliance	for	Progress	was	a	U.S.	government	program	that	provided	anti-poverty	aid	to	Latin	American	nations	in	an	attempt	to	stymie	communism’s	appeal	to	the	poor.	Kennedy	feared	that	lack	of	action	could	create	a	breeding	ground	for	more	Castro	inspired	leaders.		The	program	also	gave	a	large	amount	of	aid	to	foster	leaders	who	supported	liberal	democracies,	and	increase	the	number	of		self-sufficient	citizens	who	respected	both	government	and	business.	However,	this	self-sufficiency	threatened	the	power	Latin	American	establishments	enjoyed	having	over	their	citizens.	Seventy	two	million	dollars	was	provided	to	Peru	over	the	course	of	the	1960s	for	modernization	projects,	but	this	money	failed	to	correct	the	real	problem	of	land	inequality.		Military	assistance	came	through	the	Alliance	for	Progress	as	well,	but	with	a	shift	from	hemispheric	defense	to	focusing	on	maintaining	stability	within	each	nation,	a	policy		known	as	Internal	Security	Doctrine.	The	implementation	of	the	Internal	Security	doctrine	meant	that	Latin	American	militaries	would	not	only	need	to	cut	their	spending,	but	simultaneously	focus	on	preventing	uprisings	by	dissident	political	forces.	However,	Peru	lost	direct	Alliance	for	Progress	funding	over	an	ongoing	dispute	with	a	North	American	oil	company	(IPC)	over	subsoil	rights.	The	consideration	of	expropriation	to	settle	the	conflict	violated	one	of	the	conditions	for	funding.		Peru’s	military	felt	that	they	were	being	defanged	and	betrayed	by	their	traditional	ally.	For	the	Peruvian	people,	IPC	was	the	symbol	of	foreign	oppression	and	arrogance	as	this	North	American	company	believed	itself	to	be	entitled	to	Peruvian	resources.	The	military	wished	to	be	an	important	player	in	the	domestic	scene	rather	than	an	enforcer	of	the	status	quo.					
22		 	The	uproar	over	the	suppression	of	the	peasant	movement	led	to	a	divisive	1962	presidential	election.	The	new	and	more	moderate	APRA	party	nominated	Victor	Haya	de	la	Torre,	Belaúnde	returned	as	candidate	for	Popular	Action,	and	Odría	came	back	as	head	of	his	own	party.	The	United	States	supported	Haya	because	of	his	strident	anti-communism.	Haya	remarked	after	his	visit	to	the	Soviet	Union	that	communism	managed	to	improve	lives	only	marginally	and	without	liberty	while	the	APRA	would	improve	lives	with	both	liberty	and	bread	for	all.	The	success	of	the	APRA	campaign	deeply	unsettled	the	military	and	when	it	appeared	that	Haya	had	beaten	Belaúnde,	the	military	deposed	the	government	to	prevent	the	left	leaning	party	from	gaining	power.	In	1962,	This	plan	was	disrupted	by	General	Ricardo	Godoy’s	military	coup.		The	1962	election	ended	with	an	alliance	between	the	Odría	and	APRA	that	the	military	could	not	accept.	Godoy	overthrew	the	government	to	prevent	APRA	influence	in	the	government.	The	United	States	severed	relations	immediately	following	the	non-democratic	government	takeover.	This	meant	Peru	immediately	lost	of	both	military	and	non-military	aid.	The	State	Department	sent	a	telegram	to	the	embassy	in	Peru	stating,	“The	United	States	Government…feels	Junta	government	must	understand	that	developments	in	Peru	have	created	difficult	problem	for	USG	involving	military	assistance	programs	both	for	Peru	in	particular	and	for	LA	in	general.	…	At	some	appropriate	time-	perhaps	early	next	year-	we	would	be	prepared	to	review,	in	light	of	developments,	subject	of	military	aid	level	for	remainder	of	interim	period	prior	return	normal	situation.”38	The	United	States	attempted	to	use	military	aid	as	a	stick	to	promote	a	future	free	election,	but	the	coldness	of	the	Organization	of	American	States	to	this	process	forced	the	United	States																																																									38	U.S.	Department	of	State,	“Outgoing	Telegram	to	the	embassy	in	Peru,	September	10,	1962.		
23		 	to	resume	diplomatic	relations	with	Peru.	Attempting	to	use	the	cutoff	of	military	aid	as	influence	would	continue	to	be	a	favored	and	important	tactic	used	by	the	United	States	even	past	the	institutional	revolution	of	1968.				 Nationalism	and	Marxism	Another	important	aspect	of	Peruvian	foreign	policy	and	other	Latin	American	nations	included	the	embrace	of	nationalist	ideology.	Peru	realized	that	nationalism	provided	an	important	way	to	retain	power	through	its	simple	repudiation	of	all	matters	foreign	and	communist.39		The	United	States	was	shocked	that	its	repudiation	of	the	coup	mattered	little	to	the	Peruvian	public.	Godoy’s	military	government	would	also	become	an	early	inspiration	for	the	institutional	revolution	and	left	leaning	reforms	in	1968.	Godoy	and	his	officers	embarked	on	an	agrarian	reform	program	that	promised	land	for	over	14,000	peasants,	but	the	plan	failed	due	to	the	short	lifespan	of	the	dictatorship.40	The	military	allowed	elections	the	next	year	as	they	had	promised	to	do	at	the	onset	of	their	coup.		Nationalism	increasingly	played	an	important	role	in	marshaling	support	against	the	United	States	in	Latin	America.		In	1963,	The	election	of	Fernando	Belaúnde	to	the	Peruvian	presidency	brought	a	continued	effort	toward	reform,	but	two	years	later	a	Marxist	uprising	by	the	Movement	of	the	Revolution,	MIR	or	Movimiento	de	Izquierda	Revolucionaria,	and	the	National	Liberation	Army,	ELN	or	Ejército	Liberación	nacional,	drove	a	wedge	between	the	president	and	the	military.	These	revolutionaries	hoped	to	use	Che	Guevera’s	Foco	Theory	to	inspire	the																																																									39	Stephen	Rabe,	The	Most	Dangerous	Area	in	the	World:	John	F.	Kennedy	Confronts		
Communism	in	Latin	Americ.	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1999),	121.		40	Peter	Flindell	Klarén,	Peru:	Society	and	Nationhood	in	the	Andes,	320.		
24		 	peasants	to	join	the	revolt	against	the	status	quo.41	However,	the	armed	forces	quickly	assassinated	the	leader	of	the	MIR	and	cleaned	up	the	rest	of	the	leftist	movement	by	the	January	of	the	following	year.	The	United	States	refused	to	supply	napalm	for	the	counterinsurgency	campaign	in	1965,	but	it	did	grant	almost	$3	million	dollars	to	assist	in	the	operation.42		This	refusal	proved	to	many	in	the	Peruvian	military	that	the	United	States	was	not	the	friend	that	it	so	often	claimed	to	be.		The	communist	uprising	turned	a	large	part	of	the	Peruvian	military	against	the	United	States	due	to	the	lack	of	on	the	ground	support,	and	the	relative	slowness	and	disinterest	shown	by	Belaúnde	at	the	beginning	of	the	conflict.	U.S.	labor	leaders	attempted	to	rectify	the	inequalities	by	helping	the	APRA	party	unionize	peasants.43	Since	the	1920s,	the	military	had	viewed	the	APRA	party	as	a	threat	to	Peruvian	society.	All	of	these	actions	deeply	angered	the	top	brass	of	the	Peruvian	military.	Perhaps	the	most	important	result	of	the	conflict	remains	the	indelible	impression	of	poverty	that	the	Peruvian	military	encountered	during	the	counter-insurgency.	Many	officers	began	to	see	the	incredible	inequality	not	far	from	that	capital,	and	they	began	to	understand	why	the	message	of	communism	would	appeal	to	the	destitute	farmers.44		 Belaúnde’s	reform,	and	conflict	with	the	United	States		 Belaúnde’s	presidency	consisted	of	several	important	projects	to	reform	Peru’s	society	and	economy.	Agricultural	input	decreased	dramatically	in	the	first	seven	years	of																																																									41	Che	Guevara’s	guide	to	guerilla	warfare	argued	that	a	small	band	of	guerillas	could	instigate	a	revolution	by	striking	against	an	unpopular	regime	and	then	cultivating	a	wide	following.	42	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-1975,	77.		43	Frederick	Pike,	The	United	States	and	the	Andean	Republics:	Peru,	Bolivia,	Ecuador,	330.	44	Ibid.,	78.	
25		 	the	1960s	as	investment	moved	towards	the	burgeoning	industrial	section.45	Agrarian	reform	began	with	the	president’s	tour	of	the	Sierra	by	truck	and	horse	to	speak	with	peasants,	and	welcome	them	into	a	popular	cooperation.46	Unluckily	for	the	campesinos,	Belaúnde	believed	that	the	first	step	for	the	agrarian	reform	would	be	to	construct	a	massive	road	along	the	Ceja	De	la	Selva	or	Eyebrow	of	the	Jungle	to	connect	the	Amazon	rain	forest	to	the	rest	of	Peru.	The	peasants	acted	before	agricultural	reforms	could	be	created,	and	almost	400	haciendas	owners	lost	their	lands	from	1963	to	1964.	The	government	reacted	by	sending	in	special	troops	to	wrest	control	from	peasants,	and	over	300	died	before	the	1964	agrarian	bill	was	signed	into	law.	This	bill	based	redistribution	upon	productivity	only	with	land	over	150	hectares	designated	to	be	split	up,	but	only	for	farms	not	considered	to	be	highly	productive	or	held	by	foreign	citizens.	However,	the	law	never	went	into	full	effect	and	only	four	percent	of	redistributed	land	became	the	property	of	one	percent	of	rural	families.	The	deterioration	of	US-Peruvian	relations	would	only	truly	begin	in	1966.		The	government	of	Fernando	Belaúnde	and	the	Peruvian	military	became	upset	over	the	declining	quality	of	American	officers	sent	to	help	train	their	soldiers.	This	was	due	to	growing	American	involvement	in	the	Vietnam	War,	which	caused	American	military	aid	to	decline	precipitously.	The	United	States	reduced	the	number	of	advisors	from	sixty	six	in	1966	to	nineteen	just	two	years	later.	In	a	response	to	the	falling	military	aid,	Belaúnde’s	government	purchased	12	French	Mirage	III	jets,	16	British	Canberra	bombers,	a	number	of	
																																																								45	Klarén,	Peru:	Society	and	Nationhood	in	the	Andes,	332.			46	Jaymie	Heilman,	Before	the	Shining	Path:	Politics	in	Rural	Ayacucho,	1895-1980,		(Palo	Alto:	Stanford	University	Press,	2010),	123.		
26		 	U.S.	made	F-80	and	86	jets,	and	in	1967	several	British	cruisers.47	The	United	States	generally	sold	the	vast	majority	of	equipment	to	Peru,	but	Belaúnde’s	action	marked	an	important	shift.	Many	Latin	American	leaders	believed	that	if	a	military	received	more	weaponry	it	would	be	pacified;	thus	less	likely	to	stage	a	coup.			The	United	States	gave	an	offer	of	Northrop	F-5	fighter	jets	to	try	to	stop	the	sale	of	the	Mirage	jets,	but	disagreements	over	debt	payments	turned	the	Peruvians	towards	the	French	jets.48	This	exact	situation	was	to	plague	the	U.S.-Peruvian	relationship.	The	final	nail	in	the	coffin	of	the	Belaúnde	administration	would	not	be	a	military	matter,	but	its	failure	in	1968	in	resolving	a	decades	long	conflict	with	the	New	Jersey	based	International	Petroleum	Company.		Natural	Resources	and	foreign	exploitation	of	them	were	always	an	aspect	of	Peru’s	history.	Spain’s	conquest	of	the	New	World	began	Peru’s	reliance	on	the	extraction	of	natural	resources,	particularly	silver,	but	reliance	on	the	earnings	from	exports	as	well	as	foreign	influence	continued	on	its	domestic	economy	long	after	independence.	For	Example,	the	International	Petroleum	Company,	IPC,	based	in	New	Jersey,	began	operations	in	Peru	in	1914,	and	bought	the	La	Brea	and	Pariñas	oilfields	in	1924	from	a	British	company.49	IPC	continually	claimed	that	it	had	special	privileges	of	natural	resources	that	allowed	the	company	to	control	the	subsoil	rights.50	The	Peruvian	government	attempted	in	multiple	instances	to	charge	higher	taxes,	but	always	backed	off	when	the	International	Petroleum	Company	pressured	the	government	with	halting	gasoline	supplies.	The	biggest	problem	as	neither	party	could	prove	who	actually	owned																																																									47	Sharp,	U.S.	Foreign	Policy	and	Peru,	18.	48	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	108.		49	Sharp,	U.S.	Foreign	Policy	and	Peru,	247.		50	Clayton,	Peru	and	the	United	States:	The	Condor	and	the	Eagle,	92.		
27		 	the	subsoil	rights.51	Each	decade	created	more	and	more	Peruvian	hostility	and	nationalism	towards	the	foreign	company.		The	U.S.	became	involved	even	though	the	Standard	Oil	Company	Peruvian	subsidiary	was	registered	as	a	Canadian	company.	Still	it	asked	for	protection	from	the	United	States.	The	oil	company	controlled	of	over	60	percent	of	Peru’s	oil	by	the	end	of	the	1920s,	and	loaned	Peru	over	450,000	dollars	in	the	beginning	of	the	Great	Depression.	Politicians	and	newspapers	loved	to	decry	the	power	of	the	IPC	especially	attacking	the	company	for	failing	to	pay	enough	taxes	and	failing	to	treat	Peru	with	respect.	From	the	beginning,	many	called	for	the	nationalization	of	the	International	Petroleum	Company	as	it	controlled	the	majority	of	Peru’s	oil,	but	only	in	the	1960s	would	the	call	be	taken	seriously.		The	movement	to	nationalize	IPC	heated	up	in	1965	as	Belaúnde	promise	to	collect	back	taxes,	and	settle	ownership	came	to	a	head	as	the	Popular	Action	party	decided	to	endorse	nationalization	with	compensation	as	a	solution.52	The	United	States	had	recently	been	forced	to	temporarily	end	economic	aid	due	to	the	tuna	boat	controversy,	and	the	State	Department	informed	the	Peruvian	president	that	nationalization	was	unacceptable.	This	decision	as	well	as	IPC’s	refusal	to	come	to	a	resolution	over	oil	prices	and	subsoil	rights	continued	to	hurt	the	president.	The	problems	with	American	tuna	boats	and	funding	came	from	seizures	in	1966	and	early	1967,	but	with	an	extremely	important	diplomatic	development.	Republican	Congressman	Thomas	Pelly	from	Washington	state	used	the	opportunity	to	introduce	an	amendment	to	the	Foreign	Military	Sales	Act	of	1968.	The	Pelly	Amendment	prevented	the	United	States	from	selling	any	military	hardware	or	
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28		 	even	service	to	a	foreign	nation	that	seized	American	fishing	vessels.53	Once	again	this	amendment	would	deeply	complicate	the	US-Peruvian	relationship,	and	make	diplomacy	far	harder	for	the	State	Department.	January	27th	of	1968	marks	an	important	turning	point	as	Belaúnde	issued	a	decree	that	forced	negotiations	between	IPC	and	the	Peruvian	state	oil	company,	Empresa	
Petrolera	Fiscal.	IPC	executives	decided	that	speaking	with	the	oil	company	would	be	better	than	negotiation	directly	with	the	government.	These	talks	extended	into	July	with	the	help	of	U.S.	Ambassador	John	Wesley	Jones	when	IPC	decided	to	transfer	La	Brea	y	Pariñas	and	its	subsoil	rights,	which	the	company	had	owned	since	the	1920s,	to	Peru	in	exchange	for	the	government	dropping	its	back	taxes	claims.54	The	agreement	signed	in	August	of	1968	became	known	as	the	Act	of	Talara	with	the	price	of	oil	remaining	high	for	IPC,	and	allowing	workers	to	remain	employed.	The	United	States	sighed	with	relief,	as	they	believed	this	constant	problem	had	finally	been	resolved,	but	the	nation	did	so	prematurely.	The	actual	contract	of	the	Act	appeared	to	be	missing	the	crucial	page	eleven	that	returned	control	of	the	oilfields	to	Peru,	and	the	nationalist	segment	of	Peruvian	society	decided	that	the	oil’s	company	supposed	treachery	and	the	incompetence	of	Belaúnde’s	government	could	no	longer	be	tolerated.	The	military	knew	that	the	APRA	party	could	easily	come	to	power	in	the	upcoming	elections	with	the	increased	unpopularity	of	the	Belaúnde	regime.	A	military	coup	under	the	leadership	of	General	Juan	Velasco	Alvarado	deposed	Belaúnde	on	Oct	3rd	1968,	and	seized	the	oilfields.	The	United	States,	distressed	and	surprised,	cut	off	relations.	1968	was	not	a	typical	year	for	U.S.-Peruvian	relations.																																																										53	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	96.		54	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	128.		
29		 	Peru	and	the	United	States	maintained	an	unusually	beneficial	relationship	from	the	beginning	of	nationhood.	Peru	happily	accepted	military	support	after	each	of	the	great	global	conflicts	during	the	20th	century.	The	Cold	War	brought	the	a	sizable	number	of	US	sponsored	coups	to	depose	or	attempt	to	depose	left	leaning	governments,	such	as	in	Guatemala,	Cuba,	Dominican	Republic,	and	Chile,	but	Peru	managed	to	avoid	the	worst	effects	of	anti-communism	from	its	powerful	northern	ally.	However,	political	differences	beginning	in	the	1960s	came	to	a	head	with	the	1968	Peruvian	Revolution.	The	accompanying	accommodation	by	the	United	States	was	due	in	great	part	to	the	traditional	military	connection,	and	the	deep	respect	and	trust	that	the	United	States	felt	towards	the	Peruvian	military.	Velasco’s	“Revolution	from	above”	would	test	the	relationship	in	a	way	never	seen	between	the	two	nations.				 		 	 	 		 	 																			
30		 	Chapter	3	The	Institutional	Revolution	in	Peru	1968-1972	and	the	U.S.	Response			 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 	 	 		 Introduction	October	3rd	1968’s	great	event	began	with	a	flurry	of	telephone	calls,	and	ended	with	the	exile	of	the	Peruvian	president,	Belaúnde,	to	Argentina.	Juan	Velasco’s	rise	to	power	officially	began	the	Peruvian	Revolution	(1968-1975).	The	Peruvian	Revolution	caught	the	Central	Intelligence	Agency,	President	Belaúnde,	and	the	world	off	guard.	The	Peruvian	government’s	actions	over	the	next	few	years	continued	to	surprise	the	United	States.	Velasco	unleashed	revolutionary	changes	in	Peru.	Five	main	events	marked	Peru’s	turn	towards	a	more	independent	foreign	policy	that	eventually	included	the	purchase	of	large	quantities	of	Soviet	weaponry.	First,	The	Plan	Inca	agrarian	reform	in	June	1969	ushered	in	a	period	of	expropriation,	and	challenges	to	the	Peruvian	oligarchy.	Second,	the	formation	of	the	Andean	Pact	in	May	of	the	same	year	threatened	to	construct	a	regional	alliance	that	could	destroy	the	traditional	hegemony	of	the	United	States	in	Latin	America.	Third	was	a	devastating	earthquake	in	May	1970	that	impacted	both	the	United	States’	relationship	with	Peru	as	well	as	the	development	of	the	Soviet-Peruvian	relations.	Fourth	in	1972,	the	consistent	seizure	of	US	tuna	boats	sparked	reaction	by	infuriated	congressmen	and	businessmen	into	action	largely,	but	Peru’s	cooperation	in	the	drug	war	brought	a	sizable	cooling	to	the	U.S.-Peruvian	relationship.	In	addition	to	the	land	reform	and	tuna-boat	controversy,	Peru	nationalized	industries	owned	by	U.S.	companies.	The	fifth	event	occurred	in	Chile	rather	than	Peru	and	was	one	of	most	important	events	in	Latin	America	during	the	1970s.	Socialist	Salvador	Allende	was	elected	president	in	September	
31		 	1970	leading	President	Nixon	and	National	Security	Advisor	Henry	Kissinger	to	begin	to	accept,	with	some	reluctance,	that	Latin	America	had	emerged	as	one	of	the	most	important	areas	in	global	politics	to	the	jubilation	of	some,	and	the	horror	of	many.	These	events	highlight	both	the	attempts	of	Peru	to	change	its	position	in	the	region,	the	concurrent	problems	that	made	the	U.S.-Peruvian	relationship	difficult	to	manage,	and	the	earthquake	that	cooled	the	relationship	but	brought	the	Soviet	Union	into	Peru.		The	United	States	needed	to	retain	Peru	as	an	ally	to	combat	communism	in	South	America	and	to	retain	access	to	Peru’s	natural	resources.	Peru	wanted	to	become	more	independent	economically	from	the	United	States,	and	embark	on	a	mission	of	modernization.	These	two	visions	ran	headlong	into	one	another	with	both	nations	feeling	that	they	not	accommodate	one	another’s	demands	or	cut	ties.						 	 	 From	Belaúnde	to	Velasco	The	deterioration	of	U.S.	–Peruvian	relations	in	the	1960s	is	due	to	a	few	important	moments.	The	ever-continuous	controversy	over	U.S.	tuna	fisherman	fishing	in	Peruvian	waters	stirred	deep	feelings	of	nationalism	among	the	Peruvian	people	against	the	United	States.	The	guerilla	uprising	in	1965,	and	the	U.S.	army’s	refusal	to	supply	napalm	to	Peru	greatly	damaged	its	relationship	with	the	Peruvian	army.	Finally,	the	US	refusal	to	sell	supersonic	jets	to	Peru	showed	many	in	Peru	that	dependence	on	the	United	States	would	need	to	be	gradually	curtailed.	Despite	these	ruptures,	the	United	States	would	continue	to	try	to	mend	the	relationship.	Why	would	Peru	get	this	special	treatment	and	other	left	leaning	nations	in	Latin	America	would	not?			
32		 	Despite	Peru’s	anti-U.S.	and	anti-free	market	policies,	US-Peruvian	relations	remained	relatively	cordial	in	the	Velasco	era.	The	strain	would	be	great,	but	both	nations	worked	desperately	to	keep	events	from	moving	too	far	from	the	pre-1960s	amiability.	Traditionally,	the	two	bedrock	policies	of	the	United	States	towards	Latin	America	were	that	the	governments	in	the	region	needed	to	promote	a	friendly	business	climate	for	foreign	private-sector	capital;	and	secondly	Latin	American	governments	needed	to	keep	Soviet	influence	out.	Left-of-center	nations	such	as	Chile	and	Guatemala	received	a	cold	shoulder	when	attempting	to	change	their	societies,	but	Velasco	benefited	from	the	fact	that	the	U.S.	allowed	greater	flexibility	for	Peru’s	relationship	with	the	Soviet	Union.		The	result	of	Peru	purchasing	Soviet	arms	was	that	the	United	States	realized	that	accommodation	was	the	only	coherent	option	for	the	Latin	American	nation.	The	answer	for	this	outcome	is	a	combination	of	historical	ties,	exceptional	diplomacy	on	the	part	of	the	Peruvians,	the	firm	non-Marxism	of	the	Peruvian	Revolution,	minimal	ties	to	Cuba	and	the	USSR,	and	compensation	for	expropriated	U.S.	companies.	The	lack	of	another	feasible	option,	such	as	finding	dissident	generals	to	stage	a	coup,	also	played	a	pivotal	role.				 Velasco:	background		 	Juan	Velasco	Alvarado	grew	up	in	relative	poverty	in	northern	Peru	but	joined	the	army	when	he	was	19	to	escape	his	former	life.55	He	was	accepted	to	the	Chorillos	Military	School,	which	was	modeled	on	American	military	academies	and	gained	attention	for	his	performance	and	personal	charisma.	In	1965,	Velasco	became	chief	of	staff	of	the	army,	and	discovered	the	intransigence	of	the	Peruvian	congress	to	change	and	its	slowness	in																																																									55	Abraham	Lowenthal	and	Cynthia	McClintock,	The	Peruvian	Experiment	Reconsidered	(Guildford:	Princeton	University	Press,	1983),	215.		
33		 	fighting	leftist	guerillas.	The	general	despised	the	International	Petroleum	Company’s	control	over	so	much	of	the	nation’s	resources.	Ultimately,	the	company’s	refusal	to	honor	the	Act	of	Talara,	the	act	that	would	require	of	I.P.C.	to	turn	over	the	La	Brea	oilfields	to	Peru	in	exchange	for	concessions,	proved	to	be	too	much	for	Velasco,	and	the	generals	and	colonels	around	him.		Velasco’s	greatest	influence	came	from	neither	the	United	States	nor	the	Latin	American	leftist	tradition.	The	mid-nineteenth	century	Peruvian	president	Ramón	Castilla	created	the	template	for	the	Peruvian	Revolution.56	Castilla’s	military	rule	was	marked	by	modernization	of	the	armed	forces,	laws,	and	a	respect	for	constitutions.	This	president	wielded	power	through	a	series	of	decrees,	which	included	the	abolition	of	slavery.	Castilla’s	core	beliefs	stemmed	from	Peruvian	nationalism,	and	he	initiated	a	defense	treaty	with	Chile	and	Bolivia	to	protect	South	America	from	an	aggressive	Spain.	Velasco	remained	a	committed	nationalist	and	anti-communist	all	of	his	life,	and	defined	his	beliefs	and	goals	to	his	friend	Meza	Cuadra,	“Power	spreads	its	tentacles	from	above.	Everywhere	the	rich	pull	the	strings.	The	big	companies	call	the	shots.”	He	continued,	“We	need	to	press	for	reform	in	Peru,	to	regain	its	sovereignty,	especially	in	relation	to	the	United	States.”57	The	other	important	influencer	on	Velasco	was	Marxist	philosopher	José	Mariátegui’s	seminal	work	Seven	Interpretive	Essays	on	Peruvian	Reality,	which	expressed	the	view	that	drawing	on	the	Incan	past	could	reform	Peruvian	society.				
																																																								
56 Dirk Kruijt, Revolution by Decree: Peru, 1968-1975, 11. 57	Kruijt,	Revolution	by	Decree,	73.		
34		 	The	Revolution	from	Above	Begins	On	Velasco’s	first	day	in	office,	he	stated,	“The	Revolutionary	Government,	at	one	with	the	aspiration	of	the	Peruvian	people	calls	on	them	to	struggle,	together	with	the	armed	forces,	to	attain	authentic	social	justice,	dynamic	national	development,	and	the	reestablishment	of	the	moral	values	which	alone	can	guarantee	the	achievement	of	the	highest	destiny	for	our	fatherland.”58	His	closing	remark	on	October	3rd	left	the	United	States	with	several	important	questions.	Could	the	United	States	expect	more	action	against	American	businesses,	and	would	this	be	emulated	by	other	Latin	American	nations?	No	one	could	be	certain	if	the	statement	reflected	the	true	beliefs	of	Peru’s	new	leaders,	but	the	military	wasted	no	time	in	showing	that	their	words	would	lead	to	action.	The	new	government	immediately	declared	the	Act	of	Talara	to	be	void,	and	the	United	States	responded	by	suspending	relations	the	same	day.59	This	simply	meant	that	the	United	States	would	review	the	situation	while	the	embassy	in	Lima	continued	to	operate.	The	Velasco	regime	assured	the	three	largest	mining	companies	in	Peru	that	IPC’s	expropriation	was	not	a	threat	to	other	foreign	companies	that	followed	Peru’s	laws.60	(Discussed	Below)		 Oil	Expropriation	Roils	US-Peruvian	Relations	Five	days	after	the	United	States	suspended	relations	with	Peru,	Velasco	assembled	a	few	hundred	officers	in	the	Presidential	Palace	to	announce	that	the	military	would	take																																																									58	North,	Liisa	and	Tanya	Korovkin,	The	Peruvian	Revolution	and	the	Officers	in	Power:	1967-
1976	(Montreal,	McGill	University,	1981),	44.		59	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-1975,	145.		60	“Peruvian	Seizure	of	IPC	Assets”	Central	Intelligence	Bureau,	CIA-RDP78-03061A000400020009-8	[CIA	CREST,	CIA	Records	Search	Tool,	System,	National	Archives	and	Records	Administration,	Archives	II,	College	Park,	MD]	(Hereafter	Crest,	NARA	II)		
35		 	over	the	oilfields	of	La	Brea	y	Pariñas.	The	decree	noted	that	foreign	investment	would	still	be	welcome	in	Peru,	but	only	if	they	followed	the	law.61	While	IPC	reacted	with	indignation,	the	Peruvian	populace	jubilantly	celebrated	the	long	desired	victory	over	the	ultimate	symbol	of	U.S.	oppression	in	Peru.	October	9th	brought	the	expropriation	of	the	refinery	in	Talara	and	continued	dodging	by	Peru	on	the	question	of	compensation	based	upon	the	belief	that	IPC	owned	Peru	hundreds	of	millions	in	back	taxes.62	Nixon’s	inauguration	in	January	1969	changed	very	little	in	policy	towards	Peru	as	Nixon	focused	on	resolving	the	conflict	in	Southeast	Asia.				 From	Bilateral	Relations	to	Regionalism		Although	the	State	Department	wanted	time	to	think	about	the	situation,	members	of	Congress	and	the	oil	industry	rushed	to	the	State	Department	to	ask	that	the	Hickenlooper	Amendment,	that	required	aid	and	funding	to	be	cut	off	from	any	nation	that	expropriates	U.S.	businesses	without	compensation,	to	be	invoked.	The	State	Department	hated	the	Hickenlooper	Amendment	because	it	limited	diplomatic	flexibility	and	removed	the	important	bargaining	chip	of	military	aid	completely.	The	popularity	of	the	military	government	among	the	Peruvian	people,	and	the	reluctance	of	the	Secretary	of	State,	Dean	Rusk,	to	use	the	amendment	gave	Peru	time	to	prevent	relations	from	further	deteriorating.	President	Lyndon	B.		Johnson	and	Ambassador	Jones	decided	to	recognize	the	junta	for	fear	that	the	United	States	would	lose	influence	over	the	revolutionary	government.63		
																																																								61	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1968-1975,	148.		62	Lawrence	Clayton,	Peru	and	the	United	States:	The	Condor	and	the	Eagle,	247.		63	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	154.	
36		 	Congress	and	State	Department	continued	to	spar	over	the	Hickenlooper	Amendment	during	Velasco’s	seven-year	rule,	and	the	United	States	continued	to	resist	punitive	actions	against	Peru	for	fear	of	losing	influence.	In	a	memorandum	from	the	State	Department	to	the	Assistant	for	National	Secretary	Affairs,	Henry	Kissinger,	the	agency	coolly	gauged	effectiveness	of	the	amendment	as,		“Suspension	of	aid	and	the	sugar	quota	will	have	a	serious	adverse	impact	on	the	Peruvian	economy,	probably	lead	to	reprisals	against	other	US	investments,	alienate	the	Peruvian	people	and	stimulate	an	actively	hostile	policy	toward	the	US,	perhaps	push	Peru	further	toward	economic	and	diplomatic	relations	with	the	Soviet	bloc,	and	damage	US-Peruvian	relations	for	a	long	time	to	come—all	with	repercussions	harmful	to	our	interest	elsewhere	in	the	hemisphere”64			The	Revolutionary	government	of	Peru	finally	received	recognition	on	October	25	1968,	but	the	relationship	remained	rocky	until	1975.	In	July	1969,	arms	sales	were	reinstated	as	a	sign	of	good	faith	but	discontinued	once	again	in	1972	with	the	return	of	tuna	boat	seizures.65	Along	with	the	internal	politics	of	Peru,	the	regional	politics	of	South	America	formed	an	important	part	of	the	United	States	reaction	to	the	coup.	Brazil	proved	to	be	the	United	States’	most	important	ally	in	the	region	after	a	military	coup	in	1964.66	General	and	president	Emilio	Garrastzu	Medici	stated	to	Nixon	in	1971,	“Our	position	cannot	be	the	same	vis-à-vis	every	international	problem-	nor	is	this	expected	from	our	frank	and	loyal	friendship-	let	us,	never-the	less,	endeavor	to	make	our	policies	converge	without	requiring																																																									64	Department	of	State	to	Assistant	for	National	Security	Affairs,	Henry	Kissinger,	“Memorandum	for	Dr.	Kissinger”,	January	28,	1969,	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States,	1969-1976,	Volume	E-10,	Documents	on	American	Republics,	1969-1972.	eds.	Douglas	Kraft	and	James	Siekmeier	(Washington:	Government	Printing	Office,	2009),	Document	576.	https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d576	65	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	265.	66	Tanya	Harmer,	Allende’s	Chile	and	the	Inter-American	Cold	War	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2011),	22.	
37		 	that	they	coincide	in	every	case.”67	General	Medici	would	play	an	important	role	in	the	Augusto	Pinochet’s	Chilean	coup	in	1973.	U.S.	foreign	policy	accepted	more	deviation	from	Latin	American	norms	as	the	Cold	War	went	on	due	to	the	need	for	allies.	The	fear	that	communism	would	infiltrate	South	America	drew	vast	amounts	of	money	from	the	United	States	for	reforms	with	Chile	receiving	the	lion’s	share.	Chile’s	president,	Eduardo	Frei,	received	over	$3.2	million	dollars	from	the	Central	Intelligence	Agency	to	prevent	the	ascendency	of	Allende	in	the	1970	election.	Bolivia’s	election	of	two	one-term	presidents	from	1969	to	1971	attracted	a	similar	attention	from	the	United	States	and	Brazil.	Bolivia’s	relationship	with	the	United	States	moved	in	a	fascinatingly	ambivalent	way	beginning	in	the	early	1950s	with	Bolivia	utilizing	fear	tactics	to	force	the	United	States	to	send	economic	aid	to	prevent	left	wing	uprisings	or	a	diplomatic	move	towards	the	Soviet	bloc.68	Despite	the	large	amount	of	agency	in	the	relationship,	Bolivians	turned	further	towards	nationalism	and	left	wing	dictatorships	in	response	to	anger	over	the	decline	in	American	aid	after	Che	Guevara’s	disastrous	1967	mission	in	Bolivia.	The	Bolivian	junta	nationalized	Gulf	Oil	in	October	1969,	only	a	year	after	the	Peruvians	expropriated	IPC	holdings,	and	the	United	States	responded	by	dramatically	cutting	aid.69	However,	Bolivian	and	U.S.	leaders	both	disliked	the	response	and	an	agreement	to	pay	compensation	occurred	almost	a	year	later.	Compensation	helped	to	fix	the	relationship	between	Bolivia	and	the	United	States	and	demonstrated	that	respect	for	private	property	was	one	of	the	principal	values	of	U.S.	foreign	policy.																																																										67	Samuel	Baily,	The	United	States	and	the	Development	of	South	America,	1945-1975	(New	York:	Franklin	Watts),	164.		68	James	Siekmeier,	The	Bolivian	Revolution	and	the	United	States,	1952	to	the	Present	(University	Park:	Pennsylvania	State	University	Press,	2011),	5.	69	James	Siekmeier,	The	Bolivian	Revolution	and	the	United	States,	127.		
38		 	The	seizures	of	tuna	boats,	often	referred	to	as	the	Tuna	Boat	War,	continued	to	play	an	important	role	in	regional	politics	for	Latin	America.	Ecuador,	Chile	and	Peru	shared	a	hatred	for	the	American	fishermen	who	they	believed	encroached	upon	their	rights	to	the	sea’s	natural	resources.	1952	brought	the	Declaration	of	Santiago	in	which	all	three	nations	asserted	a	two	hundred	mile	limit	from	the	coast	to	foreign	fisherman.70	The	United	States	refused	to	recognize	this	declaration	due	in	part	to	desire	to	defend	Taiwan	from	China,	and	the	setting	for	the	Tuna	Wars	was	established.	International	law	guarantees	every	state	three	miles	of	sea,	but	the	general	trend	for	nations	is	to	protect	twelve	miles.71	Peru,	Ecuador,	and	Chile	all	claimed	in	excess	of	200	nautical	miles	to	protect	their	fishing	industries	in	the	1960s	and	1970s.	The	Pelly	Amendment,	which	required	the	United	States	to	pay	the	fines	of	fishermen	by	deducting	aid	allocated	to	the	host	nation,	and	requiring	military	sales	to	be	halted,	came	from	this	longstanding	issue.	Military	ships	sold	to	Ecuador	and	Peru	by	the	United	States	seized	U.S.	commercial	vessels.	This	was	an	outrage	to	many	in	the	North	American	nation.		Ecuador’s	relatively	left	leaning	president	Juan	Velasco	Ibarra	ramped	up	the	tuna	seizures	in	1971	just	as	Peru’s	Velasco	did,	but	Ibarra	faced	an	end	to	military	sales	and	responded	with	the	expulsion	of	the	U.S.	military	mission.	In	1969,	as	a	result	of	its	seizure,	Peru	briefly	lost	military	funding,	and	responded	by	expelling	its	U.S.	military	mission.72	Velasco	angrily	expelled	the	U.S.	military	mission	in	retaliation	even	though	he	would	have	preferred	the	troops	to	stay,	but	his	nationalist	beliefs	forced	him	to	do	something	against	
																																																								70	Ronn	Pineo,	Ecuador	and	the	United	States:	Useful	Strangers,	175.	71	Encyclopædia	Britannica	Online.	http://www.britannica.com/topic/territorial-waters.	Date	Accessed	June	20th,	2016 72	Richard	Walter.	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	173.		
39		 	the	injustices	against	Peru.73	Public	opinion	in	Peru	sided	heavily	towards	Velasco,	and	the	United	States	leadership	realized	that	sanctions	would	only	continue	to	improve	the	president’s	political	position.		Peru	attempts	to	smooth	US-Peruvian	Relations	Peru’s	desire	to	solve	the	tuna	crisis	through	mediation	came	through	a	proposed	meeting	between	Ecuador,	Peru,	and	Chile.	This	meeting	proved	to	American	officials	that	military	sales	should	be	resumed	on	July	4th	1969.74	The	tuna	controversies	in	1969	proved	to	the	United	States	that	punitive	measures	would	not	do	well	in	dealing	with	Velasco,	but	Peru’s	willingness	to	work	with	the	United	States	to	mediate	disputes	helped	move	both	nations	towards	settlement.	American	foreign	policy	would	have	to	be	more	conciliatory	towards	the	Latin	American	nation	as	the	military	government	would	merely	play	that	nationalism	card	or	go	elsewhere	if	they	believed	they	were	receiving	a	raw	deal.			On	the	first	day	of	the	Peruvian	Revolution,	General	Mercado	Jarrín	stepped	into	the	position	of	Foreign	Minister	with	a	plan	to	disrupt	Latin	American	politics	by	intentionally	manipulating	the	United	States.	The	General	believed	that	Peru	could	make	up	for	its	weakness	by	establishing	links	with	Yugoslavia,	Poland,	and	the	Soviet	Union	to	force	the	“Colossus	of	the	North”	to	make	concessions	to	his	nation.75	Training	at	Fort	Leavenworth,	
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40		 	and	the	Inter-American	Defense	College	in	Washington	D.C.	made	Mercado	the	perfect	candidate	for	foreign	minister.		Although	appointed	by	Velasco’s	predecessor,	Ambassador	to	the	US,	Fernando	Berckemeyer,	held	opposing	conservative	views	to	the	government	that	he	served.	Berckemeyer	spoke	English	fluently,	was	married	to	a	North	American	woman,	and	had	spent	over	eight	years	as	ambassador	to	the	United	States.	He	also	promised	to	be	the	perfect	candidate.	Velasco	decided	that	Berckemeyer	would	remain	the	ambassador	to	the	United	States	as	a	diplomatic	tactic.	The	ambassador	could	play	the	role	of	a	captive	to	the	left	leaning	government	in	order	to	convince	the	Americans	that	a	further	shift	to	the	left	would	transpire	if	U.S.	officials	did	not	follow	the	ambassador’s	advice.	These	two	foreign	policy	members,	Mercado	and	Berckemeyer,	would	play	an	integral	role	in	advancing	Velasco’s	diplomatic	goals.			 The	Revolution’s	Reforms	On	June	24	1969,	Velasco	reached	into	the	homes	of	Peruvians	through	television	to	proclaim	that	the	elites	who	owned	the	land	would	no	longer	feed	off	their	poverty,	by	promising	comprehensive	land	reform.76	Velasco’s	goals	for	the	land	reform	had	far	more	comprehensive	objectives	than	the	moderate	attempt	at	land	reform	under	Belaúnde’s	presidency.	Through	agrarian	reform,	he	hoped	to	correct	the	incredible	inequities	in	Peruvian	society	and	prevent	impoverished	peasants	from	turning	to	communist	ideology.	Agrarian	reform	played	an	important	role	in	national	security	to	the	minds	of	the	military	leaders	as	disenfranchised	peasants	could	easily	turn	towards	communism	or	the	APRA																																																									76	Orin	Starn,	ed.	2.	The	Peru	Reader	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2005),	284.		
41		 	party.	Seven	hundred	hacienda	owners	ruled	over	half	of	the	best	land	and	employed	twenty	percent	of	all	rural	families.77	These	hacienda	owners	refused	to	build	schools	for	their	employees	and	immediately	replaced	workers	at	the	hint	of	unionization.	Indeed	the	land	of	the	powerful	and	American	affiliated	company	Casa	Grace	or	Grace	Corporation,	which	controlled	over	fifty	percent	of	sugar	production,	was	expropriated	the	day	after	the	Plan	Inca	announcement	ended	the	corporation’s	long	history.	Land	exemptions	from	the	reform	varied	from	area	to	area,	but	peasants	and	community	members	could	protest	an	exemption	if	they	believed	that	the	land	could	be	put	to	a	better	communal	use.78	Under	Velasco,	water	became	a	national	resource	to	be	protected	by	the	government	thereby	eliminating	hacienda	control	of	streams	and	rivers.		The	revolutionary	government	hoped	that	the	reform	would	destroy	the	power	of	the	landed	aristocracy,	improve	the	lives	of	peasants,	remove	the	threat	of	communism,	and	increase	the	productivity	of	Peru’s	agricultural	yield.79	The	land	given	to	the	peasants	would	be	split	up	into	two	distinct	types	of	cooperatives.	Agrarian	Production	Cooperatives	focused	on	the	large	coastal	estates	and	the	Agrarian	Social	Interest	Societies	would	take	control	of	the	best	sierra	land	properties.	Hacienda	owners	would	be	compensated	with	government	bonds.		These	cooperatives	would	be	based	upon	gender	mutualism	(men	and	women	in	the	farm	working	closely	together)	of	the	Incan	past,	but	the	government’s	vision	of	gender	did	not	match	the	Quechua	women’s	ideas.	Campesina	women,	women	from	the	countryside,	viewed	their	place	as	being	in	the	field	with	their	men.	However	the	cooperatives,	run	by																																																									77	Maria	R.	Shaleth,	“Land	Reform	Under	Military:	Agrarian	Reform	in	Peru,	1969-78”	
Economic	and	Political	Weekly	Vol.	26,	No.	30	(July	27,	1991),	83.	78	Cynthia	McClintock,	Peasant	Cooperatives	and	Political	Change	in	Peru	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1981),	73.		79	Peter	Flindell	Klarén,	Peru:	Society	and	Nationhood	in	the	Andes,	346.		
42		 	men,	thought	women	should	be	mostly	in	the	home.80	Despite	the	lack	of	understanding,	the	author	of	When	Women	Rebel	does	credit	the	birth	of	the	women’s	movement	in	Peru	to	the	government’s	actions	to	try	to	improve	the	lives	of	women.		Plan	Inca’s	consequences	continue	to	be	hotly	debated	into	the	twenty-first	century.	Close	to	8.5	million	hectares	of	former	landlord	property	was	given	to	workers,	which	increased	their	salaries	by	25	percent.	Coastal	workers	received	far	more	benefits	than	their	sierra	counterparts.	The	poorest	farmers	often	received	no	benefits	from	the	reform,	and	unbounded	laborers	were	exploited	by	the	system.81	By	the	end	of	1975,	still	only	twenty	five	percent	of	the	rural	population	enjoyed	access	to	the	land.82	However,	the	agrarian	reform	did	lead	to	an	increase	in	production.	Rice	production	grew	dramatically	because	new	lands	could	now	be	worked,	and	mechanization	began	and	improved	the	productivity	in	cotton	and	potato	production.83	Plan	Inca	did	not	live	past	Velasco’s	reign	or	succeed	in	supplanting	communism	among	peasants,	but	it	did	endear	the	Peruvian	people	to	the	leaders	of	the	revolution.			 Peru’s	Push	for	Economic	Independence		The	next	step	for	Peru	in	the	first	years	of	the	military	government	consisted	of	intense	efforts	to	garner	foreign	loans	for	development.	In	a	shocking	move,	Peru	announced	that	relations	with	the	Soviet	Union	had	been	established	on	February	1,	1969,	
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43		 	and	a	trade	deal	became	public	knowledge	less	than	three	weeks	later.84	The	United	States	applied	non-overt	economic	pressure	to	Peru	by	denying	investment	and	credit	from	U.S.	businesses	and	international	lending	groups	while	avoiding	confrontations	over	the	Hickenlooper	amendment.85	The	International	Petroleum	Company	requested	for	the	deferral	from	the	amendment	to	have	time	to	resolve	their	issues	with	the	Peruvian	government.	Kissinger	argued	that	these	policies	brought	Peru	closer	to	the	United	States	since	Peru	would	have	to	turn	back	to	the	United	States	for	economic	support,	but	Peru	decided	to	continue	seeking	out	investment	from	other	nations.	Peru	hoped	that	diversification	could	let	relations	with	Czechoslovakia	and	Yugoslavia	were	established	close	to	the	same	time.	In	August	1970,	the	Soviet	Union	promised	a	$30	million	credit	to	buy	Soviet	equipment	with	the	promise	that	Peru	would	import	Soviet	manufactured	goods.86	Mercado	visited	the	United	States	the	next	month	to	ask	for	help	obtaining	loans	from	the	World	Bank,	and	contending	that	the	Peruvian	Revolution	had	been	far	better	for	business	than	the	1970	Chilean	election.87	Peru	enjoyed	good	relations	with	Chile,	but	Peru	constantly	used	its	relationship	the	more	radical	nation	as	a	negotiating	tool.	Peruvian	diplomats	continually	pointed	to	the	embrace	of	Marxism	to	say	that	the	Peruvian	revolution	was	far	better	as	an	example	to	Latin	America	than	its	neighbor.		
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44		 	Apart	from	the	Soviet	Union,	another	extra-hemispheric	country	played	an	important	role	in	the	history	of	the	Andean	nations.	Japan’s	history	is	Peru	included	a	sizable	amount	of	immigration	from	the	island	beginning	in	the	late	1800s.	May	15,	1961	brought	the	two	countries	into	most	favored	nation	status,	and	by	1968,	Japan	imported	more	goods	to	Peru	than	any	other	Latin	American	country.88	Peru	particularly	sought	Japanese	and	as	well	as	European	investors	as	they	were	more	willing	to	enter	into	joint	ventures	and	contract	agreements.89		China	also	provided	a	$42	million	loan,	and	a	promise	to	buy	$100	million	dollars	worth	of	Peruvian	natural	resources.90	The	past	importance	of	Asian	nations	in	the	economy	of	Peru	and	the	large	numbers	of	immigrants	from	Asia	drove	Peru	to	seek	closer	ties.		Back	in	the	western	hemisphere,	Fidel	Castro	offered	his	support	and	praised	the	Peruvian	Revolution.	However,	Velasco	rejected	Castro’s	friendship.91	In	an	attempt	to	maintain	at	least	fairly	harmonious	relations	with	the	United	States,	Velasco	backpedaled	from	the	compliment	and	stated	that	while	the	coup	remained	revolutionary	it	adhered	only	to	nationalism	rather	than	Marxism,	socialism,	or	communism.	During	this	time,	Cuba	moved	away	from	promoting	violence	to	overthrow	capitalism	to	endorsing	candidates	or	military	leaders	who	wanted	to	move	away	from	the	United	States.	This	shift	in	tactics	helped	Cuba	become	a	more	respected	nation	in	Latin	America.	Later	in	the	revolution,	
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45		 	Peru	(partly	to	placate	the	Peruvian	public	and	the	Third	World)	worked	to	improve	the	international	standing	of	Cuba.		New	York	Times	reporter	Jose	Yglesias	coverage	of	Peru	helped	cement	Velasco’s	credentials	as	an	anti-communist,	but	benevolent	and	even	reformist	dictator.	Yglesias	spent	ten	days	visiting	Lima	and	Trujillo,	a	city	in	the	North	of	Peru.	The	reporter	was	instantly	stunned	that	there	were	no	slogans,	posters,	or	other	propaganda	in	the	capital.	He	found	that	the	population	generally	supported	the	revolution	due	to	anti-foreigner	sentiment	and	the	hope	for	an	improvement	in	their	lives.	Yglesias	then	toured	Lima	with	an	Aprista92	administrator,	noting	that	he	“explained	that	all	these	events	so	far”	[the	nationalizations]	were	simply	a	cover	for	the	negotiations	now	going	on	with	the	United	States	interests	for	the	further	development	of	the	mining	region.”93	This	article	suggests	that	the	left	wing	remained	hesitant	to	embrace	the	revolution.	Next,	the	author	met	with	a	political	prisoner	from	the	1965	rebellion.	The	meeting	that	occurred	completely	surprised	the	author.	He	simply	showed	his	passport	and	entered	the	supposed	second	worst	jail	in	Peru.	He	was	utterly	shocked	about	the	apparent	gentle	treatment	of	this	rebel	compared	to	the	rough	treatment	his	stepson	received	from	police	during	a	sit	in	at	Columbia	University.	The	author	then	spoke	with	a	Colonel	Rodriguez	from	Velasco’s	army	who	denied	that	the	president	was	creating	a	country	based	upon	a	caudillo,	a	type	of	traditional	authoritarian	leader	in	Latin	America,	and	stated	that	negotiations	with	American	copper	companies	would	end	with	favorable	conditions	for	Peru	and	businesses.	The	whole	article	reflected	the	author’s	surprise	about	the	calmness	in	a	country	rocked	by	revolution,	and																																																									92	A	member	of	the	APRA	Party.		93	Jose	Yglesias.	“The	Reformers	in	Brass	Hats”	New	York	Times,	(New	York	City,	NY),	December	14,	1969,	58.		
46		 	the	relative	freedom	given	to	prisoners	and	political	opposition.	The	Peruvian	ambassador	Berckemeyer	praised	the	Yglesias	article,	and	used	it	to	argue	that	the	junta	could	both	improve	Peru	through	minimal	control	over	dissidents	while	exercising	a	benevolent	leadership	for	the	rest	of	the	population.			 The	Earthquake	and	US-Peruvian	Relations		On	another	sunny	afternoon,	Peruvians,	many	watching	the	1970	soccer	World	Cup,	were	forced	out	of	their	seats	in	terror	rather	than	jubilation.	An	earthquake	measuring	7.9	on	the	Richter	scale	devastated	the	city	of	Chimbote	killing	over	70,000	people	on	May	31st	1970.94		The	earthquake	became	an	important	event	in	US-Peruvian	relations	because	it	allowed	the	two	nations	to	come	together	in	disaster	relief.	The	tension	over	tuna	boats	and	expropriation	briefly	ended	as	the	United	States	organized	and	sent	disaster	relief	to	the	victims	of	the	Ancash	Earthquake.	In	a	memorandum	to	National	Security	Advisor	Kissinger,	from	CIA	director	Richard	Helms	argued	that	the	earthquake	did	nothing	to	hurt	the	political	position	of	Velasco	and	actually	improved	basic	relations	between	Peru	and	the	United	States.95	Richard	Walter	visited	Peru	after	the	earthquake	was	surprised	that	despite	the	large	amount	of	anti-United	States	propaganda	in	the	form	of	graffiti	and	billboards,	Peru	gratefully	accepted	aid	and	was	delighted	to	protect	visiting	dignitaries	from	the	United	States.	President	Nixon’s	wife,	Pat	Nixon,	visited	the	disaster	stricken	area	to	help	in	the	relief	impressing	the	Peruvian	people,	and	beginning	a	close	friendship	with																																																									94	Nathan	Clarke,	“Revolutionizing	the	Tragic	City:	Rebuilding	Chimbote,	Peru,	after	the	1970	Earthquake”	Journal	of	Urban	History	4	(2015):	95.		95	“Memorandum	for	Dr.	Henry	A.	Kissinger”	June	15	1970,	[CIA	CREST	System,	National	Archives	and	Records	Administration,	Archives	II,	College	Park,	MD]	RDP79R00967A001400020015-9	
47		 	President	Velasco’s	wife.96	As	such,	the	earthquake	served	to	improve	U.S.-Peruvian	relations.		Yet,	the	earthquake’s	most	important	effect	remains	the	increased	influence	of	the	Soviet	Union.	Despite	the	lateness	of	Soviet	help,	a	July	CIA	memorandum	states	“The	Tardy,	but	dramatic,	Soviet	airlift	of	relief	supplies	will	certainly	draw	considerable	attention	in	Peru,”.97	The	Soviet	Air	Force	eventually	only	delivered	twenty-one	planeloads	of	supplies	of	the	promised	sixty-five,	but	the	aid	gave	an	important	foothold	for	the	diplomatic	relationship	between	Peru	and	the	Soviet	Union.			 Cuba,	Peru,	the	United	States,	and	the	Region		By	far	the	most	dramatic	shift	in	United	States	policy	in	Latin	America	came	in	1970	after	the	election	of	Marxist	Salvador	Allende	as	President	of	Chile.	National	Security	Adviser	Kissinger	and	Richard	Nixon	could	not	believe	that	the	people	of	Chile	would	elect	a	Marxist	to	the	presidency.	They	were	also	very	concerned	about	Allende’s	close	relationship	with	Castro.	Fidel	Castro	trumpeted	Allende’s	victory	by	proclaiming	the	defeat	of	imperialism	in	Chile	as	the	banner	headline	for	Cuba’s	state	newspaper.98	Allende’s	prior	experience	with	Cuba	included	a	trip	to	the	Island	in	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	revolution	and	subsequent	trips	in	1962,	1967,	and	1969,	helping	Cuban	revolutionaries	escape	from	Bolivia	and	significant	campaign	contributions	from	Cuba	
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48		 	during	the	election	of	1970.		The	United	States	immediately	began	covert	operations	known	as	Track	I	and	subsequently	Track	II	designed	to	overthrow	Allende.99		Peruvian	officials	responded	to	Allende’s	Election	by	stating	that	their	military	revolution	remained	committed	to	anti-communism,	hoping	to	convince	the	United	States	and	foreign	businesses	to	invest	more	in	Peru.100	Allende’s	exceptionally	positive	relationship	with	Cuba	helped	the	Peruvians	portray	the	revolution	to	their	south	as	far	more	radical	revolution	than	theirs.	The	United	States	feared	that	the	new	Chilean	path	would	lead	to	either	a	further	drift	left	in	Peru	or	lead	to	a	military	buildup	especially	since	the	centennial	of	the	War	of	the	Pacific	would	occur	in	less	than	a	decade.	Peru	lost	a	large	part	of	its	southern	provinces	during	the	war,	and	Peruvians	still	felt	deep	animosity	about	their	loss	in	their	war.	The	Centennial	renewed	feelings	of	nationalism	that	U.S.	officials	feared	could	lead	to	a	surprise	attack	from	Peru	to	recapture	their	losses.		A	secret	assessment	of	the	inter-American	situation	from	the	U.S.	embassy	in	Lima	argued	that	the	United	States	must	not	allow	the	situation	in	Peru	to	devolve	and	for	the	blame	to	fall	upon	the	United	States.101	An	alliance	between	the	Soviet	Union,	Chile,	Peru,	and	Cuba	would	be	a	diplomatic	disaster	for	the	Nixon	administration.	In	1971,	a	secret	telegram	from	the	embassy	in	Lima	to	Washington	advocated	keeping	Chile	and	Peru	from	becoming	too	close	or	becoming	too	antagonistic.102	An	alliance	between	Chile	and	Peru	could	lead	to	a	
																																																								99	Tanya	Harmer,	Allende’s	Chile	and	the	Inter-American	Cold	War,	51.	Track	I	along	with	Track	II,	conceived	by	the	CIA,	included	several	different	plans	to	oust	Allende	through	peaceful	election	processes	and	military	repression.		100	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	237.		101	Author	from	the	U.S.	Embassy	Lima,	quoted	in	Ibid.,	238.		102	Unknown,	‘Secret	Air-Gram	A-22	from	Lima	to	Washington,	January	28,	1971,”	Box	2544,	Folder	4.			
49		 	collapse	of	U.S.	influence	in	South	America	and	protect	growing	Marxism,	while	a	war	could	destabilize	the	entire	continent.		Fortunately	for	South	America,	Peru	and	Chile	maintained	a	close	but	competitive	relationship	during	the	Allende	years,	which	was	especially	remarkable	considering	their	long	history	of	animosity.	The	Velasco	regime	worked	with	Chile	on	an	effort	to	regain	membership	for	Cuba	in	the	Organization	of	American	States	(OAS).	The	United	States	efforts	against	Cuba	made	many	Latin	Americans	angry,	and	Peru	was	happy	to	exploit	their	frustration	to	increase	feelings	of	nationalism	among	them.	These	developments	frightened	the	State	Department	enough	that	they	feared	that	the	entire	southern	cone	of	Latin	America	could	unravel.		However,	as	the	decade	continued	Peru	chose	to	submit	a	resolution	to	the	Organization	of	American	States	for	a	lifting	of	sanctions	against	Cuba.103	In	1972,	the	lifting	of	sanctions	over	Cuba	put	a	wedge	between	Miguel	de	la	Flor,	new	Peruvian	foreign	minister	and	William	P.	Rogers,	new	Secretary	of	State,	during	de	la	Flor’s	first	official	visit	to	the	United	States.	The	Peruvian	administration	justified	its	resolution	on	Cuba	by	citing	Nixon’s	establishment	of	relations	with	Communist	China.104	The	OAS	continued	to	refuse	to	reinstate	Cuba	membership	in	the	group,	which	caused	Peru	to	normalize	relations	with	Cuba	on	July	9,	1972.	The	exact	reasons	for	Peru’s	defense	of	Cuba	is	debatable.	The	speculations	included	a	diplomatic	game	of	deliberately	cooling	and	warming	the	U.S.	relationship	to	garner	more	aid.	It	might	also	have	been	an	attempt	to	become	a	leader	of	the	non-aligned	movement,	or	simply	a	domestic	politics	ploy	to	extract	more	nationalist																																																									103	Unknown	Author,	Central	Intelligence	Agency,	“Notes”	December	8,	1971,	Central	Intelligence	Agency,	[CIA	CREST	System,	National	Archives	and	Records	Administration,	Archives	II,	College	Park,	MD]	RDP79T00975A020600100001-1	104	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	253.		
50		 	emotions.	It	is	still	unclear	why	Peru	would	be	willing	to	risk	so	much	by	working	with	Cuba.		 There	is	no	doubt	that	the	leaders	of	Chile	and	Peru	shared	very	similar	political	beliefs	and	followed	related	paths,	but	the	United	States	decided	to	act	against	Chile	rather	Peru.	Abraham	Lowenthal’s	and	Cynthia	McClintock’s	The	Peruvian	Experiment	
Reconsidered	argues	that	there	was	a	very	specific	reason	why	US	policy	makers	took	covert	action	against	Chile	to	destroy	Allende’s	presidency	and	not	Velasco.	This	reason	was	that	Peru	desired	to	pay	companies	back	for	expropriations	of	their	assets	while	Chile	did	not.105	Tanya	Harmer	in	Allende’s	Chile	and	the	Inter-American	Cold	War	agrees.		The	slightly	more	moderate	policies	of	Velasco,	and	the	historical	closeness	of	the	United	States	and	Peru	played	an	important	role	in	the	U.S.	government’s	decision	to	accommodate	Velasco.	Compensation	played	an	important	role	in	the	survival	of	Peru	in	the	global	community,	but	Soviet	arms	forced	the	United	States	to	approach	the	nation	with	more	accommodating	action.		Peru	continued	to	follow	an	ambivalent	foreign	policy	towards	and	against	the	United	States	and	the	more	left	leaning	side	of	Latin	American	politics.	According	to	a	report	in	1971,	a	meeting	in	the	White	House	between	Kissinger	and	the	Peruvian	foreign	minister,	Edgardo	Mercado,	“He	(Mercado)	repeated	that	(Peru)it	is	anti-Communist	and	he	said	that	Peru	viewed	with	concern	the	emergence	of	a	Marxist	regime	in	Chile	arising	from	outside	influences.	Mercado	said	those	who	seek	power	in	Latin	America	by	means	of	guerrilla	warfare	and	terrorism	will	fail	to	achieve	it,	but	that	coalitions	of	Leftist	forces	working	through	the	legal	structures	were	a	far	greater	threat.	He	said	that	the	Popular	Front	in	
																																																								105	Abraham	Lowenthal	and	Cynthia	McClintock,	The	Peruvian	Experiment	Reconsidered,	47.		
51		 	Chile,	if	it	is	successful	in	socializing	a	country,	will	have	a	powerful	demonstration	effect	in	Latin	America.”106			Velasco	expressed	this	sentiment	again	in	1972	as	he	told	the	US	ambassador	that	Peru	and	Argentina	would	need	to	be	concerned	about	the	communist	threat	to	the	South.107	The	State	Department	and	CIA	were	not	fooled	by	Velasco’s	finger	pointing,	but	the	need	for	an	ally	made	Peru	indispensible.	Chile,	Peru,	Ecuador	and	Bolivia	were	all	led	by	left	leaning	governments	in	the	early	1970s,	and	the	threat	of	these	ideologies	spreading	deeply	troubled	the	Nixon	administration.	Peru’s	government	was	leftist	but	anti-communist	while	Chile’s	government	was	leftist	and	far	friendlier	to	communist	nations	like	Cuba.	It	was	far	easier	to	negotiate	with	Peru	than	it	was	to	negotiate	with	Chile.		One	way	Peru	attempted	to	reduce	its	dependence	on	the	U.S.	was	through	forming	a	regional	commercial	integration	scheme.	In	1966,	Chile’s	Eduardo	Frei	and	Peru’s	Belaunde	met	to	discuss	creating	an	Andean	economic	bloc	that	could	work	together	to	negotiate	with	the	United	States	as	well	as	the	larger	Latin	American	markets.108	Three	years	later,	the	charter	for	the	Andean	Common	Market	constituting	the	nations	of	Bolivia,	Chile,	Colombia,	Ecuador	and	Peru	all	signed	the	agreement	to	create	a	regional	marketplace.109	The	pact	required	foreign	investment	in	basic	industries	such	as	public	services	to	give	up	at	least	fifty	one	percent	of	their	investment	within	three	years	in	order																																																									106	Embassy	in	Lima	to	Department	of	State,	“	Call	on	President	Velasco”,	June	11th	1969,	
Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States,	1969-1976,	Volume	E-10,	Documents	on	American	Republics,	1969-1972,	eds.	Douglas	Kraft	and	James	Siekmeier, (Washington:	Government	Printing	Office,	2009),	Document	631.	 107	Unknown	Author.		Central	Intelligence	Agency	Intelligence	Bulletin,	January	21st	1972.	Central	Intelligence	Agency,	[CIA	CREST	System,	National	Archives	and	Records	Administration,	Archives	II,	College	Park,	MD]	CIA-RDP85T00875R000800020017		108	Roger	Fontaine,	The	Andean	Pact:	A	Political	Analysis	(Washington	D.C.:	Sage	Publications,	1977),	12.			109	Ilya	Prizel,	Latin	America	Through	Soviet	Eyes:	The	Evolution	of	Soviet	Perceptions	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1990),	58.		
52		 	to	give	limit	foreign	influence	in	the	Andean	nations.110	Chile	and	Peru	remained	the	most	radical	members	of	the	group	until	Allende’s	death	in	1973	and	the	overthrow	of	Velasco	in	1975.	Once	they	were	removed	the	Andean	Pact	became	far	more	involved	in	neo-liberalism	than	nationalism.	Yet,	the	Andean	Common	Market	is	an	excellent	example	of	how	the	left	of	center	governments	in	Latin	America	attempted	to	move	away	from	traditional	dependence	on	the	United	States.		Despite	the	failure	of	the	Andean	Pact	to	create	an	economic	bloc	that	could	foster	the	growth	of	Andean	industrial	production,	Peruvian	policy	did	prove	successful	in	preventing	a	negative	U.S.	response	over	its	Cuban	and	Soviet	relations	and	economic	protectionism.	In	a	March	1972	memorandum	from	the	Assistant	Secretary	of	State	for	Inter-American	Affairs,	Charles	A.	Meyer,	to	Henry	Kissinger,	the	situation	between	the	United	States	and	Peru	is	concisely	defined.	“Our	non-overt	economic	pressure	policy	has	had	little	or	no	impact	on	the	military	government’s	determination	to	pursue	a	universality,	but	not	necessarily	anti-U.S.,	foreign	policy.	On	the	other	hand,	this	policy	has	contributed	to	an	adversary	relationship	between	Peru	and	the	U.S.,	which	in	turn,	has	provided	opportunities	for	exploitation	by	the	USSR.”111	The	document	defined	an	acceptable	relationship	as	one	that	promoted	favorable	trade	and	U.S.	private	investment,	and	long-term	access	to	Peru’s	natural	resources.	U.S.	market	share	of	Peruvian	exports	decreased	from	34%	in	1968	to	29%	in	1971	largely	due	to	U.S.	policy,	and	the	willingness	of	Japan,	the	United	Kingdom,	and	Germany	to	fill	up	the	investment	gap.		The	memorandum	ends	by																																																									110	Roger	Fontaine,	The	Andean	Pact,	19.		111	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	Sates,	1969-1975,	Volume	E-10,	Documents	on	American	Republics,	1969-1972	Eds.,	1,	Douglas	Kraft	and	James	Siekmeier, (Washington:	Government	Printing	Office,	2009),	Document	638.	https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d638	Accessed	May	2016.	
53		 	stating	that	a	severe	response	from	Peru	would	inevitability	occur	if	the	U.S.	continued	or	increased	pressure.	Conciliatory	action	was		clearly	seen	as	being	more	beneficial	as	a	diplomatic	strategy.	Peru	successfully	managed	to	play	the	United	States	and	the	Soviet	Union	off	one	another,	while	attempting	revolutionary	change.	Peru’s	success	in	this	manner	cannot	be	understated	especially	as	the	nation	was	one	of	the	poorest	in	the	region	and	possibly	the	closest	of	Latin	American	nations	towards	the	United	States	before	1968.			 Drugs,	the	Peruvian	Revolution,	and	the	United	States		  One	aspect	that	is	neglected	in	the	traditional	narratives	on	the	U.S.-Peruvian	relationship	during	the	revolutionary	period	is	the	subject	of	illicit	drugs.	Cocaine	is	produced	from	the	coca	plants	grown	in	the	Andes,	and	the	growth	of	the	cocaine	industry	worried	both	the	United	States	and	the	Peruvian	governments.	Significantly,	Peru	led	all	of	Latin	America	in	drug	arrests	and	seizures	in	the	early	1970s.112	In	1971,	The	Bureau	of	Narcotics	and	Dangerous	Drugs,	later	to	become	the	Drug	Enforcement	Agency,	began	to	work	with	Peruvian	Law	enforcement	at	the	request	of	Peruvian	officials.	The	Velasco	regime	feared	the	social	ills	that	the	increased	drug	trade	would	cause,	and	the	government	corruption	that	might	accompany	the	growth	of	this	illicit	market.	The	Peruvian	Investigations	Police,	PIP,	wanted	help	filming	coca	plantations,	and	the	Bureau	of	Narcotics	and	Dangerous	Drugs,	BNDD,	began	its	attempt	to	set	up	a	permanent	office	in	
																																																								112	“Comments	of	Foreign	Service	Inspectors	on	BNDD	Activities	in	Peru,”	U.S.	Department	of	State,	July	31,	1973,	General	Records	of	the	Department	of	State,	Bureau	of	International	
Narcotics	Matters	(1970-1978),	Records	Group	59,	United	States	National	Archives,	Box	11,	1-2.		
54		 	Lima.113	Paul	Gootenberg’s	Andean	Cocaine	attributes	the	growth	of	the	cocaine	industry	in	Peru	in	the	1970s	to	the	decreased	social	services	of	the	weakened	Velasco	regime.	The	author	states	that	the	death	of	agricultural	credits	as	well	as	lumber	cooperatives	created	by	the	government	forced	farmers	to	begin	producing	coca	leaves	to	support	themselves.114		During	the	early	stage	of	the	drug	war,	the	State	Department	provided	only	roughly	$600,000	dollars	to	help	support	the	PIP,	Peruvian	Investigative	Police’s	campaign	against	drug	crimes.	The	growth	of	the	drug	trade	in	Peru	terrified	the	Velasco	regime	especially	with	the	increase	in	middle	class	drug	use,	and	the	State	Department	felt	extremely	pleased	at	the	level	of	Peru’s	cooperation	in	combating	the	drug	epidemic.	One	of	the	most	startling	cooperative	efforts	during	the	period	involved	the	extradition	of	criminals	to	the	United	States.	 	 Despite	the	nationalist	rhetoric,	Peru	happily	extradited	multiple	heads	of	drug	operations	as	well	as	less	valuable	operatives.	The	deportation	of	Luis	Reyes	from	Peru	after	his	208	pounds	of	cocaine	were	discovered	in	Miami	brought	the	personal	thanks	of	the	director	of	the	Bureau	of	Narcotics	and	Dangerous	Drugs,	John	Ingersoll.115	Further	extraditions	of	drug	criminals	occurred	without	the	usual	procedures	that	would	have	slowed	down	the	process.	These	actions	allowed	Peru	to	increase	U.S.	aid	for	combating	
																																																								113	“Additional	Efforts	to	Improve	Recipient	Narcotics	Control	Capacity,”	U.S.	Department	of	State.	September	3,	1971,	General	Records	of	the	Department	of	State,	Bureau	of	
International	Narcotics	Matters	(1970-1978),	Records	Group	59,	United	States	National	Archives,	Box	11,	1.		114	Paul	Gootenberg,	Andean	Cocaine	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2009),	296.	115	“Peruvian	Cooperation	with	BNDD,”	December	21,	1971,	General	Records	of	the	
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55		 	drugs	with	from	$19,000	in	1973	to	a	proposed	increase	of	$400,000	the	next	year.116	The	State	Department	was	clearly	supporting	Peru’s	rise	as	a	regional	leader	in	the	fight	against	cocaine	production.	It	is	hard	to	imagine	that	the	great	deal	of	cooperation	between	Peru	and	the	United	States	in	support	of	the	Drug	War	did	not	affect	the	decision	to	tolerate	the	revolutionary	government,	but	future	scholarship	will	have	to	prove	the	connection.			 The	1970s	changed	the	United	States’	ranking	of	Latin	American	in	terms	of	importance	on	the	world	stage.117	Allende	became	Latin	America’s	first	democratically	elected	Marxist	president	in	1970,	and	forced	the	Nixon	administration	to	really	start	paying	attention	to	South	America.	Velasco’s	Peru	played	a	strategic	game	of	courting	the	United	States	one	day,	and	antagonizing	it	the	next.	Appealing	to	nationalism	allowed	Peru	to	confiscate	tuna	boats,	enact	agrarian	reform,	and	begin	an	Andean	movement	to	promote	economic	independence.	Despite	enacting	policies	to	move	away	from	the	traditional	goals	of	U.S.	foreign	policy,	Peru	understood	that	its	relationship	with	the	United	States	needed	to	continue	in	order	for	Peru	to	remain	economically	stable	for	the	short-term	future.					 																																																														116	“Updated	Narcotics	Control	Action	Plan	for	Peru”	September	17,	1973.	General	Records	
of	the	Department	of	State,	Bureau	of	International	Narcotics	Matters	(1970-1978),	Records	Group	59,	United	States	National	Archives,	Box	11,	5.			117	Peru,	Bolivia,	and	Ecuador	all	adopted	left	leaning	policies	to	challenge	the	regional	supremacy	of	the	United	States.	The	Nixon	administration	had	to	contend	with	an	American	public	that	was	both	fervently	anti-communist	and	tired	of	foreign	involvements	after	many	years	in	Vietnam.		
56		 		 Chapter	4		 The	first	Soviet	Military	Sales	in	South	America:	Peruvian	Agency	in	US-Peruvian	Relations			 Introduction	The	Peruvian	Revolution	suffered	setbacks	in	the	first	five	years	of	its	existence,	but	the	majority	of	U.S.	officials	believed	that	the	military	government	was	firmly	in	power.	Peru	continued	to	press	the	United	States	for	weaponry,	but	conflicts	over	tuna	rights	kept	the	United	States	from	granting	the	Peruvian	request.	The	Soviet	Union	happily	filled	the	void,	and	brokered	an	arms	deal	with	Peru	in	the	summer	of	1973.	Instead	of	acting	harshly,	the	United	States	changed	policy	toward	Peru	to	be	more	conciliatory.	An	important	factor	in	the	long	life	of	Velasco’s	regime	was	the	lack	of	dissident	generals	for	the	United	States	to	support.	The	years	of	turbulence	between	Peru	and	the	United	States	ended	after	the	Soviet	arms	deal	for	the	simple	fact	that	the	United	States	needed	an	ally	in	the	region,	and	the	North	American	nation	realized	that	continuing	hostile	policies	could	only	drive	Peru	closer	to	its	mortal	enemy.	The	United	States	interests	from	1973	to	1975	largely	continued	to	be	the	same	as	they	had	since	the	Peruvian	Revolution.	The	exception	was	the	desire	to	prevent	conflict	between	Peru	and	Chile	and	to	keep	Soviet	influence	in	Peru	to	a	minimum.	The	military	government	of	Peru’s	interests	during	this	time	period	were	to	maintain	power,	obtain	more	advanced	weaponry,	and	become	a	more	important	player	in	the	Third	World.		In	1973,	even	as	US-Peruvian	relations	were	strained,	these	relations	seemed	poised	to	get	worse.	Cuba’s	demonstration	of	Soviet	Arms	to	the	Peruvian	Military	during	a	
57		 	diplomatic	meeting	in	December	1972	eventually	lead	to	the	Soviets	providing	the	Andean	nation	more	than	$1.6	billion	dollars	in	equipment	from	1973	to	1980.118	Peru	became	the	second	nation	in	Latin	America	to	receive	Soviet	arms,	but	the	United	States’	complacent	response	is	even	more	startling.	The	simple	rumors	of	Communist	arms	reaching	Arbenz’s	Guatemala	and	similar	actions	in	Allende’s	Chile	drove	the	United	States	to	support	coups	against	their	leaders.	Why	was	Peru	able	to	obtain	significant	Soviet	arms	without	evoking	a	U.S.	response	while	Guatemala’s	acquisition	of	poor	quality	small	arms	from	Czechoslovakia;	Chile’s	acquisition	of	the	exact	T-55	tanks	that	Peru	would	purchase	a	short	time	afterwards	with	no	U.S.	intervention?	The	diplomatic	success	of	the	Peruvian	military	regime	is	explained	through	four	important	characteristics	of	the	time	period	and	the	historical	importance	of	the	US-Peruvian	relationship.	The	historical	tie	between	the	U.S.	and	Peruvian	military,	the	Nixon	administration’s	greater	trust	for	military	governments	and	non-Marxists,	and	Peru’s	compensation	for	expropriating	U.S.	companies	gave	Peru	the	advantage	that	neither	Guatemala	nor	Chile	enjoyed.	The	last	characteristic	is	that	the	U.S.	simply	needed	an	ally	in	the	region	and	Peru	could	be	trusted	more	than	the	other	Andean	nations.			 The	Legacy	of	US-Peruvian	Military	Ties	is	Key		 The	United	States	was	and	continues	to	be	the	major	arms	supplier	to	Peru	as	well	as	the	rest	of	Latin	America.	Peru	received	over	$59.3	million	dollars	in	military	grants	from	the	United	States	from	1950	until	1963.119	Military	funding	has	always	been	an																																																									118	Cynthia	McClintock	and	Fabian	Vallas,	The	United	States	and	Peru:	Cooperation	at	a	Cost	(New	York:	Routledge	Press,	2003),	28.	119	Daniel	Sharp.	U.S.	Foreign	Policy	and	Peru,	38.	
58		 	extremely	important	part	of	foreign	policy.	The	nation	receiving	the	funding	is	often	dependent	on	the	materials,	and	this	funding	often	comes	with	training	that	forges	long-term	connections	between	the	nations.	This	funding	in	1963	became	a	contentious	issue	as	President	Fernando	Belaúnde	refused	to	cut	military	spending	even	though	it	consumed	a	large	part	of	the	national	budget.	The	United	States	wanted	Peru	to	dedicate	more	resources	to	modernization.	The	rupture	continued	to	grow	after	the	United	States’	refusal	to	supply	napalm	to	the	Peruvian	army	during	the	1965	counter-guerilla	campaign.	This	deeply	angered	the	Peruvian	generals	and	led	many	to	believe	that	the	United	States	might	not	be	as	good	a	friend	as	they	claimed.120	In	1967,	the	relationship	worsened	when	a	Peruvian	loan	request	to	the	Inter-American	Development	Bank	demanded	a	policy	shift.	The	Inter-American	Development	Bank	required	Peru	to	reject	the	Peruvian	Air	Force’s	$30	million	dollar	appeal	for	supersonic	jets	in	order	to	be	accepted.121	Belaúnde	had	been	petitioning	the	State	Department	to	purchase	a	number	of	F-5	fighter	jets,	but	this	new	stipulation	led	Peru	to	purchase	French	Mirage	jets	instead.	The	United	States	condemnation	unified	the	military	and	Peruvian	people	against	the	American	economic	and	military	domination	of	their	nation.	Negative	responses	from	the	North	American	nation	would	continually	unite	the	many	different	factions	of	Peru	and	force	the	United	States	to	be	more	conciliatory.			 The	revolution	of	1968	distressed	the	U.S.	officials,	but	diplomatic	relations,	which	were	suspended	immediately,	were	renewed	only	twenty-three	days	later.	The	expropriation	of	the	International	Petroleum	Company	consistently	damaged	US-Peruvian	relations	during	the	military	regime,	and	the	threat	of	the	enforcement	of	the	Hickenlooper																																																									120	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	78.	121	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	100.		
59		 	amendment	against	Peru	created	headaches	for	both	nations.	The	Hickenlooper	amendment,	introduced	by	Senator	Bourke	Hickenlooper	of	Iowa,	in	1961	required	the	United	States	to	end	foreign	assistance	to	any	nation	that	expropriated	U.S.	related	property	without	compensation	within	six	months	of	the	action.122	The	State	Department	hated	this	stipulation	as	it	drastically	curtailed	diplomatic	flexibility.	Time	and	time	again	U.S.	officials,	such	as	Ambassador	Belcher	and	undersecretary	for	political	affairs,	U.	Alexis	Johnson,	complained	that	the	amendment	was	so	heavy-handed	that	it	became	completely	ineffective.123	Meanwhile,	Nixon	and	his	staff	argued	about	the	best	course	of	action.	Pushing	too	hard	on	Peru	could	turn	the	nation	towards	becoming	a	second	Cuba.	A	powerful,	leftist	Peru	could	embolden	other	Latin	American	nations	to	follow	its	example.124		Velasco	and	his	foreign	minister	Mercado	positioned	themselves	as	leaders	of	the	Third	World	with	the	United	States	being	the	imperial	adversary	as	a	way	to	keep	the	Peruvian	public	in	support	of	the	military	regime,	and	to	gain	international	standing	to	secure	help.		This	way	the	United	States	would	not	be	able	to	invoke	punitive	sanctions	without	both	outraging	the	Peruvian	public	and	worsening	the	regional	situation	in	Latin	America.125																																																													122	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	26.		123	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	208.	124		Hal	Brands,	“The	United	States	and	the	Peruvian	Challenge,	1968-1975,”	478.		125	Central	Intelligence	Bulletin,	February	11,	1969,	Central	Intelligence	Agency	[CIA	CREST	System,	National	Archives	and	Records	Administration,	Archives	II,	College	Park,	MD]	CIA-RDP79T00975A013100020001-3	
60		 	Fishing	in	Troubled	Waters:	Tuna’s	effect	on	the	US-Peruvian	Relationship		Luckily	for	Peru,	the	Hickenlooper	Amendment	never	resulted	in	the	removal	of	foreign	aid,	but	military	sales	were	briefly	suspended	as	part	of	the	Pelly	Amendment	in	February	1969	as	a	result	of	tuna	boat	seizures.126	The	Pelly	Amendment	required	the	United	States	to	end	arms	sales	to	any	nation	that	seized	American	fishing	vessels.	Velasco,	angry	at	U.S.	suspension	of	military	sales,	responded	by	expelling	part	of	the	U.S.	military.	He	reduced	its	mission	down	to	only	a	seven	men	advisory	team.	The	embassy	in	Lima	noted	that	the	Pelly	Amendment’s	enforcement	proved	to	many	Peruvian	officers	that	the	United	States	really	was	not	the	friend	it	claimed	to	be	and	that	the	Amendment	only	proved	that	Peru	would	need	to	become	more	independent.	The	following	May,	a	Peruvian	military	mission	left	to	investigate	weapons	in	France	as	well	as	several	other	European	nations.127	Velasco	used	the	opportunity	to	accuse	the	United	States	of	giving	up	on	the	military	assistance	agreement	of	1952.	Military	sales	resumed	later	in	1969,	but	were	once	again	removed	in	1972	for	the	same	reasons.	For	rest	of	the	military	regime’s	existence,	the	State	Department	would	recommend	using	weapons	purchases	as	a	way	to	improve	relations,	but	Congress	would	repeatedly	stymie	such	attempts.	128		Despite	Nixon’s	policy	shift	towards	a	more	accommodating	stance,	the	Pelly	Amendment	still	would	not	allow	Peru	to	receive	arms.	An	arms	demonstration	during	a																																																									126	Central	Intelligence	Bulletin,	February	11,	1969,	Central	Intelligence	Agency	[CIA	CREST	System,	National	Archives	and	Records	Administration,	Archives	II,	College	Park,	MD]	CIA-RDP79T00975A013100020001-3190.		127	Central	Intelligence	Bulletin,	May	22	1969,	Central	Intelligence	Agency	[CIA	CREST	System,	National	Archives	and	Records	Administration,	Archives	II,	College	Park,	MD]		CIA-RDP79T00975A013800010001-6.		128	Andrew	Smith,	American	Tuna:	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	an	Improbable	Food	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	2010),	127.			
61		 	trip	to	Cuba	in	December	1972	showed	Peruvian	officials	the	capability	of	modern	Soviet	weapons	and	accessibility	of	these	armaments.	Mercado	once	again	asked	for	tanks	but	instead	of	light	tanks	offered	before	he	asked	for	medium	M-60	tanks.129	The	U.S.	Military	Assistance	Advisory	Group	continued	to	offer	light	tanks,	and	Peru	subsequently	decided	to	continue	exploring	the	possibility	of	ordering	the	larger	T-54	Soviet	tanks.	The	United	States	feared	that	a	harsh	reaction	could	drive	the	domestic	politics	of	Peru,	already	largely	anti-U.S.,	towards	better	relations	with	the	Soviet	Union.		The	tuna	season	of	1973	played	an	important	role	in	the	development	of	the	Soviet-Peru	relationship.	The	return	of	the	fish	to	Peruvian	waters	attracted	many	U.S.	fishermen	and	led	to	the	Peruvian	government’s	seizure	of	twenty-two	of	these	vessels.130	Edgardo	Mercado,	now	defense	minister,	reported	to	Ambassador	Belcher	that	although	Peru	would	prefer	to	have	U.S.-made	tanks,	anger	in	Peru	over	U.S.	encroachment	on	Peruvian	fisheries	might	force	his	government	to	buy	tanks	from	the	Soviet	Union.131	Peru	began	requesting	new	tanks	from	the	United	States	in	April	of	1972	and	were	informed	that	M-41	Bulldogs	were	unavailable,	but	that	M-551	Sheridans	could	possibly	by	obtained	by	the	State	Department.132	Peru	desired	heavier	tanks,	but	the	United	States	feared	that	this	action	could	provoke	an	outright	arms	race	with	Chile.	A	month	later,	Foreign	Minister	Juan	Mercado	spoke	directly	to	the	American	ambassador	and	stated	that	Soviet	T-55	rated	highly	against	American	tanks	and	that	the	weapons	came	with	very	favorable	loan	rates,	
																																																								129	“Peruvian	Purchase	Of	Soviet	Armament:	Chronology	Of	Tank	Purchase,”	Wikileaks.	June	30,	2005.	130	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,		263.		131	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	264.		132	“Peruvian	Purchase	of	Soviet	Armament	Chronology	of	Tank	Purchase”	Wikileaks,	June	30th	2005.	
62		 	but	Peru	still	preferred	to	obtain	American	weapons.133	Peru	hoped	that	invoking	the	Soviet	tank	offer	that	the	United	States	would	be	more	accommodating.		However	in	1973,	since	the	Pelly	amendment	did	not	allow	the	American	government	to	sell	arms	to	Peru	due	to	the	1972	tuna	boat	seizures,	Velasco	ordered	tanks	in	the	summer	of	1973	from	the	USSR.134	A	report	from	the	new	American	ambassador	to	Peru,	Taylor	Belcher,	noted	that	most	Peruvians	had	little	interest	in	the	tank	purchase,	and	the	minority	who	were	concerned	had	no	ability	to	change	the	situation,	“over	the	longer	term,	Peru's	economic	problems,	e.g.	coping	with	inflation	and	availability	of	foreign	credit	in	short	to	medium	term	will	pose	far	more	serious	problems	for	the	stability	of	the	Velasco	government	than	the	arrival	of	soviet	arms.”135		Mid-1973	bought	an	attempt	to	cajole	Peru	through	a	softer	diplomacy	approach	with	Nixon	giving	approval	for	both	new	loans	from	the	World	Bank	and	Inter-American	Bank	as	well	as	loans	for	Peru	to	buy	a	number	of	F-5	fighter	jets.136	The	United	States	held	great	influence	over	international	loans.	The	US	president	even	overrode	the	punitive	sanctions	of	the	Pelly	amendment	for	Peru	as	a	sign	of	goodwill.	This	level	of	accommodation	towards	Peru	by	the	U.S.	is	an	excellent	example	of	the	belief	that	Washington	needed	the	South	American	country’s	support.		Fortunately	for	Peru,	the	United	States	decided	to	do	nothing	about	Peru’s	decision	to	buy	Soviet	tanks.	The	truly	amazing	part	of	this	event	was	the	reaction	from	the	State	Department.	Kissinger	instructed	ambassador	Belcher	to	inform	Peru,		“We	do	not	question																																																									133	“Peruvian	Purchase	Of	Soviet	Armament:	Chronology	Of	Tank	Purchase”	Wikileaks.	June	30,	2005.		134	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	265.		135	“Peruvian	Purchase	Of	Soviet	Arms:	Internal		Reaction”	Wikileaks.	June	30,	2005.		136	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	274.		
63		 	Peru’s	sovereign	right	to	buy	arms	wherever	it	chooses;	but	we	are	concerned	at	the	entry	of	the	Soviet	Union	into	the	Latin	American	arms	market…The	USG	has	every	confidence	that	the	GOP	will	thwart	any	Soviet	attempts	to	meddle	in	Peru,	but	we	do	fear	that	the	sale	itself	will	produce	a	destabilizing	effect	in	the	Area.”137	Peru’s	special	position	in	American	foreign	policy,	and	its	skilled	diplomacy	allowed	it	to	avoid	the	usual	aggressive	U.S.	response	toward	Latin	American	nations	received	when	trying	to	obtain	Soviet	arms.			 The	Soviets	in	the	Region	While	the	goals	of	U.S.	policy	are	well	defined,	the	Soviet	Union’s	strategy	in	Latin	America	is	rarely	discussed.	The	Soviet	Union	wanted	to	develop	allies	in	Latin	America,	in	effect,	to	acquire	natural	resources	and	reduce	U.S.	influence	in	the	region.138	However,	the	Latin	American	nations	would	not	be	allowed	to	expand	power	outside	of	the	western	hemisphere	so	much	that	it	would	damage	relations	between	the	United	States	and	Soviet	Union.	The	Soviet	alliance	with	Cuba	in	the	early	1960s	scarred	the	Soviet	mind	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Cuban	Missile	Crisis.	The	island	nation	would	continually	pursue	an		aggressive	foreign	policy,	providing	military	support	for	rebels	in	Angola,	Bolivia,	and	Nicaragua.	Allende	reacted	angrily	to	the	news	of	Peru’s	signing	a	Soviet	arms	agreement	as	he	had	been	considering	the	same	action,	and	this	event	gave	further	impetus	to	the	military																																																									137	Department	of	State	to	Embassy	in	Peru,	“	Peruvian	Purchase	of	Soviet	Tanks.	For	Ambassador.”	January	24th	1974,	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States,	1969-1976,	
Documents	on	South	America,	1973-1976.	Sara	Berndt,	Halbert	Jones,	James	Siekmeier	Eds.	1.	(Washington:	United	States	Government	Publishing	Office,	2015),	Document	293.	https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve11p2/d293	138	Tobias	Rupprecht,	Soviet	Internationalism	after	Stalin:	Interaction	and	Exchange	between	
the	USSR	and	Latin	America	during	the	Cold	War	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2015),	232.	
64		 	to	remove	Allende	for	doing	nothing	to	prevent	Chile’s	traditional	enemy	from	becoming	more	powerful.139	The	rumors	of	a	military	coup	in	Chile	made	many	Chileans	wary	that	Peru	would	use	the	chaos	and	incoming	Soviet	arms	to	seize	land	lost	during	the	War	of	the	Pacific.	The	tension	would	continue	even	after	Pinochet’s	successful	coup	in	September	1973.		 The	United	States	was	much	less	concerned	about	Soviet	arms	sales	in	the	early	1970s	as	compared	to	two	decades	previously.	In	1954,	a	striking	contrast	to	the	U.S.	response	to	Peru	occurred	in	Guatemala	when	President	Jacobo	Arbenz	attempted	to	purchase	arms	from	communist	Czechoslovakia.	Arbenz,	an	army	officer	who	became	president	through	a	democratic	election,	expropriated	estates	held	by	U.S.	companies	as	part	of	its	efforts	at	land	reform.140		The	United	States	became	increasingly	suspicious	of	Arbenz’s	motives.	Many	of	the	unionists	who	supported	the	President	were	communists,	and	the	military	establishment	began	to	fear	for	Guatemala’s	future.	The	rumors	of	a	coup	led	Arbenz	to	order	a	shipment	of	Czechoslovakian	small	arms	to	arm	a	people’s	militia,	which	the	United	States	used	as	a	pretext	to	engineer	his	overthrow.141	The	first	arms	transfer	from	the	Soviet	bloc	to	the	Western	hemisphere	led	to	the	overthrow	of	a	democratically	elected	leader	and	began	a	history	of	U.S.	sponsored	coups	against	left	leaning	leaders	around	the	world.	Although	one	reason	why	the	United	States	was	less	concerned	about	Soviet	arms	entering	Peru	as	compared	to	Guatemala	was	Guatemala’s	proximity	to	the	United	States,	and	the	regional	situation	in	South	America	proved	very																																																									139	Ibid.,	221.		140	John	Charles	Chasteen,	Born	in	Blood	and	Fire:	A	Concise	History	of	Latin	America	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2001),	256.		141	Piero	Gleijeses,	Shattered	Hope:	The	Guatemalan	Revolution	and	the	United	States,	1944-
1954,	279.		
65		 	different	than	in	Central	America.	Geography	proved	to	be	destiny.			 The	Regional	Setting	The	regional	situation	in	South	America	in	the	1970s	played	an	important	role	in	allowing	Peru	to	get	Soviet	arms	without	suffering	repercussions.	The	United	States	always	preferred	military	rule	in	Latin	America	to	the	generally	unstable	representative	governments,	but	Nixon	especially	believed	in	the	foundational	power	of	militaries.	On	November	6,	1970,	in	reference	to	Allende’s	election,	Nixon	stated,	“Let’s	not	think	about	what	the	really	democratic	countries	in	Latin	America	say-	the	game	is	in	Brazil	and	Argentina.	We	could	have	moves	under	the	surface,	which	bring	over	time	the	same	thing.	I	will	never	agree	with	the	policy	of	downgrading	the	military	in	Latin	America.	They	are	power	centers	subject	to	our	influence.	We	want	to	give	them	some	help.”142	For	Nixon,	it	was	easier	for	the	United	States	to	reassume	hegemony	in	the	southern	cone	through	the	support	of	military	governments.	The	election	provided	an	essential	alternative	viewpoint	for	leftism	in	Latin	America	as	Peru	became	the	country	that	the	United	States	could	work	with	rather	than	a	Marxist	Chile.143	From	the	beginning,	the	United	States	worked	fervently	to	weaken	and	potentially	end	the	Allende	presidency.	This	included	forcing	international	loan	agencies	such	as	the	World	Bank	to	deny	loans	to	Chile,	funding	opposition	parties,	and	working	with	Brazil	to	
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66		 	change	regional	politics	against	the	rising	leftist	tide.144	The	United	States	increased	the	funding	of	the	Chilean	military	during	the	Allende	years	to	maximize	contacts	within	the	armed	forces.145		Once	the	military	dictatorship	Augusto	Pinochet	ousted	Allende	in	a	coup	in	September	1973,	the	United	States	had	another	pro-U.S.	government	it	could	count	on	in	the	region.		While	the	United	States	fervently	worked	to	rectify	the	situation	in	the	Andes,	another	Latin	American	nations	looked	to	the	mountain	and	saw	the	potential	for	instability	for	the	entire	continent.	In	1969,	the	military	government	of	Emílio	Garrastazu	Médici	took	power	in	Brazil	by	ousting	another	military	government.146	The	Brazilian	government	argued	that	the	United	States	could	be	doing	more	to	combat	Marxism	in	Latin	America,	and	directly	pleaded	with	the	U.S.	ambassador	to	work	with	Brazil	to	work	against	the	Chilean	government.	Médici	told	Nixon	in	1971	that	his	government	had	already	been	exchanging	Brazilian	military	officers	with	Chilean	officers	to	spread	dissent,	and	the	U.S.	President	made	it	clear	that	money	and	other	help	could	be	discreetly	provided.147	No	other	nation	would	be	so	instrumental	in	defeating	the	Chilean	president	as	Brazil.	This	relationship	would	be	rewarded	with	the	U.S.	ignoring	human	rights	violations	in	Brazil	and	the	sale	of	F-5	fighter	jets	that	had	been	blocked	by	the	U.S.	Congress.148	The	Nixon	administration’s	trust	for	military	regimes	that	espoused	anti-communist	values	once	again	trumped	the	rhetoric	supporting	healthy	democracies.	In	another	example,	General	Hugo																																																									144	Tanya	Harmer,	Allende’s	Chile	and	the	Inter-American	System,	127.		145	Peter	Kornbluh.	The	Pinochet	File:	A	Declassified	Dossier	on	Atrocity	and	Accountability.	(New	York:	The	New	Press,	2013),	86.		146	Kornbluh,	The	Pinochet	File,	99.		147	Kornbluh,	The	Pinochet	File,	128.		148	Joseph	Smith,	Brazil	and	the	United	States:	Convergence	and	Divergence	(Athens:	University	of	Georgia	Press,	2010),	177.		
67		 	Banzer	took	power	in	Bolivia	in	1970s,	it	too	proved	a	stable,	pro-U.S.	force	in	the	region.		With	many,	pro-U.S.	military	governments	in	South	America,	Washington	could	stomach	Peru	buying	Soviet	weapons.				 U.S.	Softens	its	Policy	towards	Peru	because	of	Peruvian	Actions		 In	September	1973,	the	United	States	decided	to	end	its	punitive	sanctions	against	Peru.	Peruvians	and	U.S.	businesses	complained	to	the	New	York	Times	that	the	economic	sanctions	failed	to	have	their	desired	effect,	and	Peru	continued	to	attract	investment	from	U.S.	oil	companies.149	The	previous	pressures	from	the	United	States	lifted	constituted	a	number	of	different	techniques.	The	ban	on	arms	sales,	pressure	from	international	lending	agencies	and	New	York	banks	against	lending	to	Peru,	and	the	pressure	on	major	industrial	nations	with	ties	in	Peru	to	reduce	their	economic	relations	with	Peru	all	ended.150	U.S.	officials	apparently	agreed.	Secretary	of	Defense	Elliot	Richardson	sent	a	secret	memo	to	the	Secretary	of	State,	William	P.	Rogers,	arguing	that	the	United	States	should	resume	arms	sales	to	Peru	to	prevent	the	Soviet	Union	from	becoming	too	influential.151	The	threat	of	Soviet	influence	through	arms	sales	along	with	the	failure	of	punitive	sanctions	forced	the	United	States	to	make	a	major	u-turn	in	how	it	dealt	with	the	military	government	of	Peru.	The	State	Department	considered	a	few	alternatives,	but	any	response	that	provoked	an	angry	Peruvian	backlash	would	be	a	problem.	U.S.	leaders	wanted	to	maintain	access	to																																																									149	New	York	Times	(April	18,	1973),	8:1.			150	President’s	Assistant	for	National	Security	Affairs,	Kissinger,	to	President	Nixon,	“Status	Report	Economic	Pressures	on	Peru”,	April	17,	1969,	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States,	1969-1976,	Volume	E-10,	Documents	on	American	Republics,	1969-1972.	eds.	Douglas	Kraft	and	James	Siekmeier	(Washington:	Government	Printing	Office,	2009),	Document	595.	https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve10/d595	151	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	270.		
68		 	Peruvian	natural	resources.152		The	Soviet	arms	sales	had	forced	the	United	States	to	change	its	foreign	policy	to	be	more	conciliatory	to	Peru	to	keep	the	Latin	American	nation	from	moving	closer	to	the	Soviet	Union.		However	despite	Nixon’s	earlier	disinterest	towards	Latin	America,	the	president	admitted	that	he	wanted	to	save	Latin	America	from	communist	forces.	Peru	remained	separate	from	Chile	in	American	foreign	policy	due	to	its	non-Marxist	identification,	and	willingness	to	accept	foreign	private-sector	investment.153	A	pragmatic	approach	from	the	State	Department	and	White	House	led	the	United	States	to	accept	leftist	governments	in	Bolivia,	Peru,	and	Ecuador,	but	still	work	against	nations	moving	away	from	capitalism.	Compensation	for	expropriation	greatly	helped	to	save	Peru	from	the	same	fate	as	Chile.	The	military	government	claimed	that	the	International	Petroleum	Company	(IPC),	the	first	target	of	expropriation,	owed	Peru	almost	$700	million	dollars	in	back	taxes	that	needed	to	be	paid	in	February	1969.154	The	United	States	grew	increasingly	wary	as	Peru	chose	to	expropriate	Casa	Grace,	the	decades	old	shipping,	paper,	and	sugar	conglomerate,	in	August	the	same	year.155	Foreign	minister	Mercado	deftly	claimed	the	following	month	in	an	address	to	the	United	Nations	General	Assembly	that	Peru	only	expropriated	companies	that	had	contentious	histories	of	inequality	with	the	nation.	A	joint	agreement	between	the	military	government	and	the	Sheraton	Hotel	Company	to	build	a	modern	complex	in	Lima	greatly	helped	to	validate	the	foreign	minister’s	claim.	The	Velasco	regime	understood	that	survival	depended	on	keeping	the	United	States	close	enough	with	Peruvian	affairs	to	placate	the	United	States,	but	far	enough	that	the	Peruvian	public	would	not	believe	that																																																									152	“Peruvian	Purchase	of	Soviet	Arms:	U.S.	Policy	Response.”	Wikileaks	June	30,	2005.		153	Tanya	Harmer,	Allende’s	Chile	and	the	Inter-American	Cold	War,	152.		154	Lawrence	Clayton,	Peru	and	the	United	States:	The	Eagle	and	the	Condor.	240.		155	Richard	Walter,	Peru	and	the	United	States,	1960-75,	209.		
69		 	the	government	did	not	really	believe	in	putting	the	nation’s	interests	first.	Unfortunately	for	the	military	government,	secret	talks	over	compensating	the	International	Petroleum	Company	became	public	knowledge	in	1972	to	great	the	embarrassment	to	Velasco.156	In	1974,	the	negotiations	for	Peruvian	compensation	for	IPC	concluded	when	the	governments	of	Peru	and	the	United	States	Special	Presidential	Representative	James	Greene	negotiated	the	Greene	Settlement.157		The	International	Petroleum	Company,	Casa	Grace,	and	other	U.S.	companies	nationalized	by	Peru	received	$76	million	dollars	in	compensation	paid	by	Peru,	but	distributed	by	the	United	States.158	Robert	Dean,	Belcher’s	replacement	for	ambassador	to	Peru,	summed	up	perfectly	the	strategy	to	keep	Peru	in	the	U.S.	fold	as	well	as	the	reasons	for	why	the	United	States	remained	so	flexible	towards	the	Latin	American	nation	in	the	telegram	to	the	Secretary	of	State.		“U.S.	Security	Assistance	to	Peru	helps	to	dispose	this	militarily	ruled	country	more	favorably	to	our	overall	interests,	notably	access	to	natural	resources,	and	it	reduces	what	is	obtained	from	communist	sources.	In	terms	of	the	effectiveness	of	such	assistance	it	has	helped	to	keep	Peru	in	the	inter-American	defense	system	and	has	molded	favorably	the	attitude	of	many	of	the	current	and	also	future	officers	who	rule	and	will	probably	continue	ruling	Peru.”159			Peru’s	purchase	of	Soviet	arms	did	not	end	with	tanks	in	December	of	1973.	A	failure	to	reach	an	agreement	on	aircraft	purchases	with	the	United	States	led	to	the	USSR’s	first	military	arms	sale	to	any	Latin	American	nation	in	the	May	of	1975.160	Thirty	Soviet-Made																																																									156	Hal	Brands,	“The	United	States	and	the	Peruvian	Challenge,	1960-1975,”	481.		157	Foreign	Relations	of	the	United	States,	1969-1976,	Documents	on	South	America,	1973-1976.	Sara	Berndt,	Halbert	Jones,	and	James	Siekmeier	eds	1,		(Washington:	Government	Printing	Office,	2014),	Document	296.		158	“Peru”	National	Intelligence	Bulletin.	December	21	1974,	CIA-RDP79T00975A02730010008-0	159	“Security	Assistance	Objectives	and	Guidelines	for	Peru”	June	21st	1974,	Wikileaks,	June	30th	2005.	https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974LIMA05010_b.html	160	“Peru	Buys	First	Soviet	Military	Aircraft”	May	6	1975,	CIA-RDP79T01098A000500060002-4	
70		 	Mi-8	helicopters,	200	T-55	Tanks,	and	an	unknown	number	of	122	and	130	mm	howitzers,	SU-22	fighter-bombers,	trunk	mounted	BM-21	rocket	launchers,	and	ZSU-23-4	anti-aircraft	guns	became	part	of	Peru’s	new	arsenal.161	The	US	that	supplied	the	majority	of	Peru’s	weaponry	before	the	revolution	was	reduced	to	supplying	30	percent	in	1975.	Moreover	the	United	States’	close	military	relationship	with	Peru	seemed	threatened	when	Peru	welcomed	at	least	thirty-five	Peruvians	traveled	to	the	Soviet	Union	to	receive	air	defense	training.		The	Velasco	regime	continued	until	1975	when	the	general	fell	to	a	coup	by	more	conservative	military	leaders.	It	is	clear	that	Peru	succeeded	in	resisting	American	influence	in	arms	sales	and	continued	cooperate	with	the	Soviet	Union	after	the	United	States	changed	its	non-overt	punitive	policies.				 	 	 	 	 Implications	of	this	study	The	entrance	of	Soviet	arms	into	Peru	posits	an	important	question	to	historians.	Why	did	the	United	States	allow	the	recalcitrant	nation	to	obtain	such	weapons	without	enacting	harsh	penalties?	The	most	direct	answers	are	pure	economics	and	ideology.	Compensation	for	expropriated	businesses	and	the	disavowal	of	Marxism	gave	the	Velasco	government	the	ability	to	survive	its	move	away	from	U.S.	influence,	while	Allende’s	Chile	could	not.	U.S.	officials	apparently	agreed	with	U.S.	businessmen	that	the	economic	sanctions	were	actually	counterproductive	and	changed	the	punitive	policies.	The	regional	situation	of	Latin	American	politics	in	the	early	1970s	forced	the	United	States	to	accept	left	leaning	allies	in	its	fight	against	communism.	Leftists	came	to	power	in	Ecuador,	Bolivia,	and	Peru	during	this	period,	and	President	Nixon	did	not	react	the	same	way	to	these																																																									161	“The	Latin	American	Arms	Market”	December	17	1975,	CIA-RDP86T00608R0005001080020-7	
71		 	nations	as	he	did	to	Chile.	Peru’s	unusual	left	leaning	military	dictatorship	allowed	the	nation	to	move	away	from	the	United	States	while	simultaneously	negotiating	with	its	traditional	ally	to	keep	essential	support	flowing.		The	Peruvian	experiment	ended	in	August	of	1975,	but	the	legacy	of	Juan	Velasco	Alvarado	continued	with	the	recent	Leftist	president	Ollanta	Humala	from	2011	to	2016.		The	historiography	of	the	US-Peruvian	relationship	in	the	20th	century	is	small	compared	to	the	numerous	volumes	about	Chile,	but	it	is	equally	rich.	However	there	has	been	relatively	little	written	focusing	on	Peruvian	agency	in	this	relationship.	Walters’	Peru	
and	the	United	States,	1960-1975	is	by	the	far	the	most	comprehensive	and	important	work	in	the	historiography	that	focuses	on	the	direct	actions	of	the	military	government	in	how	U.S.	foreign	policy	developed	during	those	years.	Frederick	Pike’s	The	United	States	and	the	
Andean	Republics	is	seminal	in	introducing	the	regional	aspect,	but	it	does	not	highlight	the	role	of	Latin	Americans	enough.		This	work	is	adding	to	a	trend	in	the	historiography	that	highlights	Latin	American	agency	into	the	change	of	U.S.	foreign	policy.	Hal	Brands’	Latin	America’s	Cold	War	and	James	Siekmeier’s	Bolivian	Revolution	and	the	United	States	place	a	far	greater	importance	on	the	actions	of	elite	and	non-elite	Latin	Americans	in	the	shaping	of	Cold	War	politics	in	the	Western	Hemisphere	than	previous	authors.	Alan	McPherson’s	The	Invaded	examines	Latin	American	responses	to	U.S.	military	invasions	in	the	early	1900s	to	explain	the	eventual	end	of	this	form	of	imperialism.	These	works	have	contributed	to	the	trend	of	adding	the	importance	of	work	done	by	Latin	Americans	to	the	historiography	of	U.S.	foreign	relations.		The	diplomatic	finesse	by	the	Peruvian	government	during	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s	directly	contributed	to	U.S.	accommodation	to	the	regime.	Any	
72		 	examination	into	U.S.	foreign	policy	is	insufficient	without	studying	the	actions	and	intentions	of	the	foreign	power.					 	 	 		 	 							 											
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